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Abstract of
THE ROLE OF COMPULSORY SEALANES
IN RESOLVnrG r-roLTIPLE-USE CONFLICT
ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
An analysis of the nature of multiple-use conflict on the
continental shelf developed with particular emphasis on the
involvement ot ocean transportation and offshore oil recovery.
The wide-ranging effects which offshore marine accidents may
have on coastal residents is discussed. Trends indicate a
growth in the l.e'\/91 of conflict stemming from competition
between those wishing to use the same ocean space for the
same purpose, the same ocean space for different purposes,
and different but related ocean space for incompatible pur-
poses. Ocean transportation is identified as the single
common element in all three conflict categories. It is the
most significant con i:"ibutor to dis-economies for third par-
ties, as a result of offshore accidents. Restriction on
traditional concepts of "freedom of the seas" is seen as the
only way to reverse current trends. Compulsory vessel rout-
ing schemes, or "Sealanes," are proposed as the most promising
means of preventing accidents. They are recommended both as
a measure to control vessel movements and as a means of pre-
serving safe shipping routes which are free of man-made haz-
ards. Recent experience in Sealane usage is discussed and
some weaknesses pointed out.
ii
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PREFACE
1 have been convinced for some time that Grotian con-
of the seas are only applicable on a macrocepts of freedom
sca1e as regards the rights of nations to exploit the sea
Taken at the level of individual opera-and its resources.
tors, Whether they be ship's masters or offshore oil companies,
it is nonsense to apply these concepts without significant
modification. It is unreasonable to grant to the master of
a giant tanker-the unfettered right to sai1 it wherever and
whenever he sees fit. The consequences of his mistakes can
be too far-reaching as was so amply proven in the Torrey
Canyon case. The same h01ds true for offshore oil operators.
The world has readily accepted the imposition of strin-
gent controls upon those who operate commercial aircraft.
I maintain that this is because the consequences of a mistake
are spectacular and have an obvious capability for involving
those who live on the ground below. There is a parallel in
offshore marine operations, insofar as they affect those who
live in adjacent coastal areas. I have attempted to show
that this is so and that present trends dictate a need for
strong action at the international level to regulate the
movement of vessels and the emplacement of offshore struc-
tures, whether it be in territorial waters or on the high
111
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seas. I have chosen
schemes as the least
1 T"\l' "Sealanes" or vessel routingcompu so... ~
objectionable form of restriction on
marine operators.
One of the problems which I ran into in my research was
that of terminology. The term "Sealanes" is commonly used
in the United States to designate a vessel routing scheme
which incorporates separation of opposing traffic streams
and safe routing through natural or man-made hazards. A
"sea lane" is a lane or corridor within which all ship traf-
fic moves in the same direction. These terms are not inter-
nationally accepted, but, for reasons which I will explain,
I have chosen to use them. International usage prefers the
terms "traffic separation scheme" and "traffic lane" to make
the same designations.
My main problem in addressing my research was in deter-
mining how serious the problem really is and how effective
past efforts hav~.been in reducing the consequences of
multiple-use conflicts. Most of the material which is con-
tained in the body of the thesis has been obtained by re-
searching various newspapers and other types of factual
reports of marine accidents and public reaction to them.
Very little pas been written which views such accidents as
stemming from or contributing to multiple-use conflict. I
have taken the liberty to infer that multiple-use conflict
is the root of the issue which must be addressed.
iv
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Good factual information and statistical data have been
hard to come by. I have been fortunate in gaining the assis-
tance of several individuals without whom I could never have
undertaken the effort. I am grateful for the significant
-help provided by Cdr. John M. Duke, of the Merchant Vessel
Inspection Division, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, who pro-
vided much advice and background material on the development
of modern Sealanes in the United States. I also received
valuable assistance from Rear Admiral G.S.Ritchie, Hydro-
- .
grapher of the Royal Navy and President of the Institute of
Navigation; Mr. L. Goll, Head of the Navigation Section of
the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO; Capt. A.C. Manson,
Head of the ~mrine Division, United Kingdom Board of Trade;
Capts. R.N. Mayo and J .E. Bury of The Trinity House and
Honourable Company of Master Mariners; and Capt. I.F.
Sor.::merville and Mr. David Deacon of the Un1ted Kingdom
Chamber of Shipping; all of whom took time out from busy
schedules to provide me with unpublished information, of a
first-hand nature, on the involvement of their respective
organizations in the problem of shipping accidents and the
implementation of Sealanes to prevent them. Special thanks
is also extended to Lloyd's of London, which allowed me free
access to its casualty statistics and report files.
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THE ROLE OF COMPULSORY SEALANES
IN RESOLVING MULTIPLE-USE CONFLICT
ON THE C01'."'TIN~NTAL SHELF
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction. To the landsman, familiar with the traffic
congestion of freeways and city streets, the broad expanse
of the ocean must appear as a region free of competition for
space. \then one considers that the sea comprises about 72%
of the earth's surface, and that at any given time it is
inhabited by less than one tenth of one percent of the world's
population, he would appear to be correct. Nature, however,
has concentrated her ocean resources in a few relatively
small areas, generally on or over the continental shelves.
Man's activities on land have also been concentrated in a
relatively few locations, most of which border the sea. His
sea lines of communication tend to converge at these loca-
tions resulting in high concentrations of shipping, frequent-
ly in busy offshore areas of resource exploitation.
As a result of popUlation growth and industrial develop-
ment, offshore activities are increasing to the point where
congestion and competition for space is a growing source of
conflict. The nature of the conflict may be political, as
the governments seek to assert their national claims to the
1
use of the sea and its resources; or it may be economic as
entrepreneurs seek to exploit the same'or competing resources.
The latter is normally referred to as multiple-use conflict.
This paper addresses multiple-use conflict, particularly
as it relates to the social impact of offshore marine acci-
dents. Recent experience has shown that the deleterious
effects of such accidents can be wide-ranging, affecting
the ecology and a broad spectrum of human activities in the
coastal areas of the world. This has resulted in a growing
tendency on the part of coastal states to consider measures
to prevent, rather than to correct, these objectionable and
often costly results. In doing so, they are likely to re-
strict the freedom of action of marine operators off their
"-
coasts, even on the high seas. The shipping industry, being
the largest single user of the oceans, will be the prime
target for restrictive measures taken in the forseeable
future.
Background. . A brief resume of some typical offshore
accidents will serve to introduce the reader to the nature
of the growing use conflict and to the social impact which
it may have in coastal areas. The broader aspects of the
problems which they typify will also be discussed.
On the morning of 18 March 1967, while proceeding on
a course determined by her master to be suitable in terms
2
.~ of least time track and ship safety, the 5.5. Torrey Canyon
ran aground off the southwest coast of England. 1 She was a
supertanker of 120,890 deadweight tons capacity and one of
-. the world's largest ships. As a result of her misfortune,
she ultimately released some 117,000 tons (36,000,000 gallons)
of crude oil into the sea. 2 The ensuing large-scale efforts
to prevent or remedy serious ecological damage to the coasts
of England and France vividly demonstrated that the conse-
quence~ of major offshore accidents may deeply involve parties
other than the ship's owner, its crew, and its master. In
May of 1967, referring to the extensive havoc caused by the
Torrey Canyon's grounding, Prime Minister Harold Wilson of
the United Kingdom stated that his government was considering
any action which lay within its control to prevent a recur-
rence of the episode.' He raised the possibility of control-
ling the routes taken by giant tankers and other ships
carrying dangerous cargo, without waiting for international
agreement. He stated, "The old concept of territorial waters
is not enough." A Government White Paper proposed that the
law of the sea, regarding shipping on the high seas, was
" ••• quite out of date.,,4
Early on the morning of 18 January 1971, the 17,000 ton
tanker, Arizona Standard, proceeding into San Francisco Bay,
collided with her sister ship, Oregon Standard, which was
outbound with a cargo of burUter oil. As a result, some
,
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840,000 gallons of oil were released into the bay and along
the Pacific coast. 5 It took the efforts of government
agencies, workmen from Standard Oil Company, and thousands
of citizen volunteers to minimize the consequences of the
accident, which are not yet fully known. The impending
collision was observed by a helpless operator at an experi-
mental Harbor Advisory Radar installation, operated by the
United States Coast Guard in San Francisco Bay. Had both
vessels been required to maintain radio communications with
the radar operator, and had he the authority to direct their
movements, it is unlikely that the accident would ever have
occurredo6 Once again, an accident resulted fr()m errors in
judgement on the part of experienced seamen exercising their
traditional rights to proceed without externally imposed
controls. Once again, parties not directly involved in the
process which led to the catastrophe were required to exert
a major effort to protect the public good.
During the period from 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1965, an
average of three collisions per year occurred between sea-
going vessels and offshore oil structures in the Gulf of .
Mexico, many of them in international waters.7 In one such
collision, the vessel backed away from the oil platform
carrying burning oil tanks which had been deposited on her
foredeck. 8 All of the elements needed for a major marine
disaster were present. In another instance, a large
4
'- sea-going vessel struck and virtually destroyed an unmanned
offshore oil platform, toppling it into the sea and releasing
large quantities of oi1.9 The danger to mariners and plat-
form crews from such occurrences is obvious, but it is the
well publicized Santa Barbara 011 spill of 1969 which more
nearly typifies the consequences to coastal residents. As
a result of this oil well blow-out, between one and three
million gallons of oil were spilled into the sea, causing
extensive pollution of the adjoining coastal area. 10 While
this particular accident was not the result of a collision
between a vessel and an offshore oil rig, it bears witness
to the degree of third party involvement which ~ght result
should such an accident occur.
Forms of Multiple-Use Conflict. Each of the incidents
described abQve is an example of the growing problem of
multiple-use conflict in the coastal areas of the world.
They represent forms which specifically involve ocean trans-
portation and which represent conflicts with a maximum
potential for creating disaster or dis-economies for third
parties.
Griffin11 and Clingan12 have categorized such multiple-
use conflicts into three major groupings:
Transitory use of the seme ocean space for the
same purpose.
5
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Use of the same ocean space for different
purposes.
Use of different but related ocean space for
different and obnoxious purposes.
Use of the Same Space for the Same Purpose. Competition
for transitory use of the same space for the sarne purpose
primarily involves ocean transportation, and, to a lesser
extent, such activities as commercial fishing and recreational
boating. At its worst, it results in collisions between
major sea-going vessels such as that between the Arizona
Standard and Oregon Standard. As a minimum, it leads to
uncerta:hlty, inconvenience, and lost time enroute. Despite
the existence of internationally accepted Rules 'of the
Nautical Road, implementation of voluntary traffic separation
schemes and technological advances such as radar, collision
at sea occurs at an alarming rate. It constitutes the lead-
ing class of maritime casualty.13
Different Uses of the Same Space. Conflicts between
different users of the same ocean space most frequently
involve ocean transportation, offshore oil recovery, and
commercial fishing. To a lesser extent, they also include
recreation, scientific research and military operations. A
typical example ,is presented in the Gulf of Mexico where
thousands of oil recovery platforms exist in open waters.
-Of these, almost 2,000 exist in water which is navigable by
6
-.
deep draft vessels. 14 They, therefore, constitute an impedi-
ment to navigation and a hazard to ocean transportation.
The conflicts resulting from offshore oil activities
also exist in the Santa Barbara Channel off the coast of
California. They are expected to extend to George's Bank,
off the coast of New England, and to the fishing grounds off
Canada's Maritime Provinces. Exploration leases have already
been let and exploratory drilling has started in the latter
area. 15 Active offshore drilling has been underway in the
North Sea for some time.
Another example of this type of conflict has existed
for years in offshore regions such as George's ~ank and the
Grand Banks of Newfoundland. It involves both ocean trans-
portation and commercial fisheries. 16 The accepted North
Atlantic track routes should normally take trans-oceanic
. *traffic south of the banks , however, the opening of the
St. Lawrence Seaway in 1959 has increased the level of large
ship traffic through the fishing grounds. Another compli-
cating factor has been the growing tendency of ship operators
*This conflict has been internationally recognized
for some time. Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 17 June
1960 (16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.B. 5780.) Chapter V, reg. 8
provides rr(c) The Contracting Governments • • • will also
induce owners of all ships crossing the Atlantic to or
from parts of the United States or Canada via the vicinity
of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland to avoid, as far as
practicable, the fishing banks of Newfoundland north of
latitude 43° N. during the fishing season, •••• "
7
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to employ weather routing in preference to the track routes. 17
Any North Atlantic sailor who has dodged trawlers on the banks
off Canada and New England 1s well aware of the danger and
confusion which exists there, particularly in poor visibility
which is so common.
The Use of Different Space for Different Purposes. The
use of different ocean space for different and obnoxious
purposes normally involves polluting or otherwise rendering
adjacent ocean space or the seabed unfit for other desired
activities. Several activities such as dredging, offshore
mining, and waste disposal are factors in this class of
conflict, but it is oil which is the subject of'growing and
often emotional concern throughout the world. The harmful
consequences of oil pollution extend to practically all
activities both in the vicinity of the land-sea interface
and further offshore.
The furor resulting from the Banta Barbara oil spill in
1969 stimulated executive action at the highest levels in
the federal government. 18 The detrimental effects of off-
shore oil operations on fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico
have long concerned conservationists there. The New England
Fisheries and Conservation Committee, expecting an expansion
of offshore oil'recovery into the region of Georgets Bank,
has raised the question of possible harm to fisheries ~hould
a major oil well blowout occur. 19
8
It is not offshore oil production, however, which is
the prime contributor to the world-wide problem of oil pollu~
tion. The ocean transportation industry has been the prime
source of oil pollutants along the coastlines of the world
for years. 20 The problem is growing despite the existence
of international conventions and controls which have been
unilaterally imposed by coastal states.* It is estimated
that one tenth of one percent of the volume of oil trans-
ported by sea is discharged into it as a pollutant. 22 A
paper presented to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in November 1970 stated that at least one million
tons of oil were released into the sea annually as a result
of strandings, collisions, and other shipping 1~sses.23
Routine oil spillage resulting from deballasting and tank
cleaning is estimated in the President's Report on Oil Pol-
lution to have reached a potential annual average of 100,000
tons. 24 Massive oil spills, resulting from strandings like
those of the Torrey Canyon, Ocean Eagle, Arrow, and~
*Typical examples of unilateral actions by coastal
states are the "Oil Pollution Act, 1924," (33 USC 431-437)
and Canada's Bill C-202, Arct~l Water Pollution Prevention
Bill, enacted in August 1970. International conventions
dealing with oil pollution include the 1954 International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil (12 UST 1523, TIAS 4 900,600 liNTS 205) Article 24 of
which provides a basis for pollution control within the
contiguous zone by authorizing a coastal state to regulate
activities therein to prevent inf'ringement of its "sani-
tary regulations. tl
9
Gettysburg, and collisions such as that between the Arizona
Standard and the Oregon Standard, are the major causes of
*public concern. The rapid onslaught of pollution resulting
from such incidents is devastating and requires huge expen-
ditures of time, manpower, and money to mitigate the results.
Public Reaction. The Torrey Canyon incident truly
awakened the world to the consequences of massive oil spills
immediately offshore. Perhaps the attention which her mis-
fortune has focused on the problem has resulted in a dis-
torted public impression that the frequency of such incidents
is growing. It cannot be denied, however, that the elements
~or increased risk and level of danger are present. Modern
industry demands increasing amounts of hazardous or obnoxious
bulk materials to ~eed it. For the foreseeable future the
major share of these materials will be carried by sea. At
present one out of five vessels is engaged in transporting
petroleum products or other dangerous cargo. 25 In 1968,
1120 million metric tons of oil were carried by sea, amount-
ing to 55%, by volume, o~ all ocean cargo. 26
*Each of these incidents resulted in rapid release
o~ oil in the Vicinity of populated coastal areas.
Estimated spills amounted to Torrey can!on, 18 March
1967, 36,000,000 gallons; Ocean Eagle, March 1968,
3,000,000 gallons; Arrow, 4 February 1970, 3,800,000
gallons; Esso Gettysburg, 21 January 1971, 386,000
gallons; and Oregon Standard, 18 January 1971, 840,000
gallons.
10
In a speech before the New York Oil Pollution Conference
in December 1969, Under-Secretary of the Interior Russel E.
Train, in discussing the growing threat, stated that our
increasing energy requirements would force us to go to more
remote areas, including deeper offshore waters, to meet our
needs. Referring to the difficulty in cleaning up spilled
oil, he stated that society"••• must determine what level
of risk is acceptable
tive" action. 27
••• n and take appropriate "preven-
The Thesis. The key word in Under-Secretary Train's
speech is "preventive." Multiple-use conflict will not
disappear of its own accord. Also, it is clear that the
problem is international in nature and will, therefore, re-
quire international cooperation for its solution. What is
not so clear-is that an effective solution, which prevents
rather than corrects the consequences, is very likely to
challenge many aspects of the traditional and inter-nation-
ally agreed upon concepts of freedom of the seas.
It is the position of the author that the well-being
of those who inhabit the margins of the world's oceans super-
cedes these traditional concepts as they are currently
exercised by individual operators. The prerogative of the
master to sail his ship wherever and whenever he sees fit,
or for an offshore oil operator to erect a structure without
11
regard for other users, should be reviewed and reassessed
in the context of the times. There is no intent to challenge
the rights of nations to use the world ocean. Within the
limits of agreed-upon conventions, transportation, exploita-
tion of resources, science, defense, and other legal uses
should remain unimpaired. It is, however, only reasonable
that coastal states should be afforded the means to protect
their citizens and resources from the depredations of dis-
interested non-nationals. If they are unable to do so through
international machinery, they are likely to do so on a uni-
lateral basis.
It is in the best interests of the maritime nations and
the shipping industry to implement a truly effective solution
to the problem of offshore collisions and strandings. Nations
which have large numbers of offshore oil structures are well
advised to take action at an early stage to limit the degree
of conflict between shipping and oil recovery operations.
The most logical approach to address the broadest spectrum
of conflicts is a system of compulsory vessel routing schemes,
or "Sealanes," which are protected from encroachment by o~her
users of ocean space. Admittedly this will be restrictive
to both forms of activities, however, if properly managed
it need not cost either unduly.
12
CHAPTER II
THE NEED FOR ACTION
The Common Element. Obviously ocean transportation is
the major common element in all three conflict categories.
In the first two categories, ship-ship collisions and ship-
structure collisions lead to direct losses for those who own
the vessels, the cargoes or offshore structures. They may
also lead to significant loss of life for those on board.
Vessel strandings and deballasting operations are the main
factors in the third conflict category, that of obnoxious
use of different ocean space. Whenever vessel collisions
result in large-scale releases of obnoxious or hazardous
materials, the first two categories overlap into the third.
Economically speaking, ocean transportation is the most
productive user of ocean space. 1 It is, therefore, reason-
able and proper to ask whether it is really necessary to take
some form of restrictive action to reduce the incidence of
accidents involVing shipping. How many collisions or strand-
ings occur? What are the trends? Will the problem resolve
itself without action on the part of the maritime community?
In order to answer these questions, it is worthwhile
to examine the situation which currently exists, the trends,
and the actions which have already been taken to. address the
problem. Figures 1 and 2 are plots of vessels totally lost,
~. 13
in terms of tonnage and individual ships, from 1955 through
1969. 2 Partial losses due to various causes are plotted in
Figure 3 for the same period. 3
The Vessel Stranding Hazard. Stranding has been a major
category of marine casualty since the days when man first
put to sea. The first seamen truly sailed into the unknown.
Lacking charts, timepiece, or compass, they were in no posi-
tion to know where they were let alone what dangers existed
beneath the surface of the sea. Much of the romance which
is presently associated with the mariners of old can be
attributed to the danger and uncertainty which they faced,
and rightly so, for many never returned as their small
vessels stranded or foundered off strange shores.
Things began to develop rapidly with the dawning of the
age of discovery in the fifteenth century. As man girdled
the globe and came to covet the exotic products of distant
lands, the volume of seaborne trade steadily increased. The
loss of ships due to stranding was intolerable and the head-
lands, rocks and shoals in the Vicinity of the world's busy
ports became veritable graveyards for ships. Prior to the
advent of the steamship, the maritime community devoted the
major part of its safety efforts to minimizing this costly
danger. Some of the more obvious efforts included better
charting, more accurate position fixing, and aids to ~Viga­
tion to warn mariners away from unknown hazards.
14
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Efforts to reduce strandings continued without letup
into the steamship era. Better charts, extensive buoyage,
and all-weather electronic aids such as radio beacons, LORAN
and DECCA were implemented. Yet, despite the best efforts
of modern man, stranding continues to be a major problem,
not only for those who operate ships, but also for those
who inhabit the coastlines adjacent to busy shipping routes.
Figures 1 and 2 clearly show that stranding is the most
significant cause of total loss of vessels. In terms of par-
,
tial damage to vessels over 500 gross tons it ranks third,
*following collisions and contact damage. There was a clear
upward trend in losses due to stranding until 1967 at which
time a reversal occurred; hopefully, a permanent one. The
reason for the reversal is not fully clear, however, it may
be more than just a coincidence that commencing in June of
that year the first in a worldwide series of vessel routing
schemes was implemented in the Strait of Dover. 5
A vessel may become stranded due to an "act of God,"
improper charting of navigational hazards, or a variety of
other reasons beyond the control of her master. In the
majority of cases, however, errors in judgement on the part
*Contact damage falls short of total loss of a vessel.
It is a term used by the Liverpool Underwriters to desig-
nate damage resulting from a vessel striking objects such
as piers, submerged ~ecks, rocks, and offshore structures,
to mention but a few.
17
of ship's personnel are the cause. A review of statistics
compiled by the U.S. Coast Guard reveals that in the period
from 1 July 1969 to 30 June 1970 personnel fault was the
primary cause of 329 of 531 groundings for which cause was
determined. Of the vessels involved, 48 were tankers and
122 were of over 10,000 gross tons displacement. Most of
the groundings occurred in U.S. inland waters, however, a
surprising ?1 occurred on the open seas off the coast.6
The most significant concern of coastal states, with
regard to stranding, other than loss of life, is the threat
of massive pollution of their coastlines. The Torrey Canyon
incident, which has been previously discussed, focused the
attention of coastal states on the degree of possible damage
.~ to the coastal environment and the cost to correct it.? The
reaction which this monster spill evoked in the British
government was duplicated elsewhere. South Africa proposed
legislation in 1968 which would have denied the right of
innocent passage for tankers within 12 miles of its coast.
Since the Summer Loadline Zone comes to within 13 miles at
some points off the coast, vessels complying with the Inter-
national Loadline Convention of 1966 would have been fure1eled
through a corridor no more than one mile Wide as they rounded
the southern tip of Africa. The International Chamber of
Shipping (reS) called this potentially dangerous situation
to the attention of the government which amended its .
18
legislation. With the cooperation of the ICS, the govern-
ment developed a vessel routing scheme which includes traffic
separation and which, in some places, comes within 12 miles
of the coast. 8
In the case of South Africa, the threat of prohibitive
legislation caused the shipping industry not only to accept
rigid vessel routing, but to propose it. This departure
from a traditional position of resisting all efforts to curb
the freedom of the ship's master to sail his vessel wherever
and however he chooses may become increasingly necessary.
Canada's Bill C-202, Arctic Waters Pollution Act, represents
another unilateral action on the part of a coastal state to
protect its coastal environment by regulating vessel move-
ments on the high seas. 9 By enacting this legislation in
August 1970 Canada extended its authority to impose regula-
tions on foreign shipping out to a distance of 100 miles
from her coast, north of the sixtieth parallel. Bill C-202
was enacted over the protest of the United States, which
characterized it as a unilateral infringement on the freedom
of the seas which would restrict merchant Shipping.10 The
Canadian government has responded by claiming that present
international law is not adequate to protect coastal states
from damage due.to oil pollution. It proposes to develop
new concepts to correct the deficiencies. 11
19
The United States, which objected so promptly to Canada's
action in passing the Arctic Waters Pollution Act, has within
its own Executive Branch elements which would impose controls
on vessels on the high seas. In its first report, the Presi-
dent's Panel on Oil Spills pointed to the inability of a
sovereign state, under international law, to control the
movements of a vessel which constitutes a pollution threat
to its coastal areas, until it is within the Contiguous Zone.
Accordingly, the panel recommended that:
Further study be made on designation of
sea lanes for control of tanker routing and
that steps be taken to develop and implement
a U.S. plan for avoidance of hazardous or unique
areas by tankers carrying oil and other hazardous
substances. Every effort should be made to make
use of designated sea lanes mandatory rather than
at the option of the tanker Captain.12
There is, implicit in the foregoing statements and
government actions, a strategic warning to ship operators
and major shipping nations. Unless they, in cooperation
with international bodies such as the Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organization (IMCO), take the lead in
developing acceptable and effective measures to prevent
massive oil spills, coastal states will take unilateral
action to restrict their freedom of movement, even on the
high sea. There is a strong possibility that such actions
could result in large dis-economies for the industry.
20
Collisions Between Vessels. Strandings have been shown
to be the most significant cause of total loss of vessels
and massive oil spills. When considered on an overall basis,
however, collisions are the most common cause of ship casu-
alty.
Prior to the advent of the steamship, collision between
seagoing vessels was a rare occurrence. Sailing vessels,
by the nature of their means of locomotion, were hardly
likely to encounter one another head to head, a situation
which has been proven by experts to be the most conducive
to collisions at sea. 13 Within a short time after its
arrival, the steamship had injected a new and significant
dimension into the problem of safe navigation. Freed of
the need to conform to weather patterns, those who navigated
mechanically propelled vessels took the most direct routes
between ports of origin and destination. Making accurate
use of the growing system of aids to naVigation, both as
landfalls and points of departure, opposing streams of traf-
fic tended to concentrate at specific locations at the
approaches to major ports. The collision rate took a preci-
pitous upward turn resulting in many spectacular accidents
toward the end of the nineteenth century. As collisions
continued to grow in frequency and cost, the maritime commu-
nity began to develop a system of procedures and. ship con-
struction standards to reduce both the occurrence and
consequences. 21
-.
On an international basis, the first steps taken to
curb the collision danger were done at the urging of the
President of the United States. In Washington, in 1889,
the Conference of all Maritime Nations codified the Inter-
. national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. 14
Subsequent Safety of Life at Sea (SaLAS) conferences were
held in London in 1913, 1928, 1948, and 1960, all of which
have addressed the collision problem, among other things.
At the present time the primary international forum for
matters concerning the safety of life at sea is the Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) of the Inter-governmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO). Since its formation in
1959, as a result of ratification of the 1948 Geneva Conven-
tion, IMCO has grown in stature and effectiveness in most
matters relating to international shipping. The collision
problem has a high place on its list of priorities.
In addition to the procedural and regulatory remedies
which he has sought, man has applied his developing tech-
nology to the problem of preventing collisions. With the
introduction of radar, it was felt that a large percentage
of collisions which are attributed to poor visibility could
be substantially reduced. This hope is far from being real-
ized; indeed, some studies have pointed to just the opposite
result which has led to the coining of the term,· "radar
assisted collision."15
22
Despite all of the activities described above, and
many more which are too numerous to mention, man has been
unable to reduce the long term upward trend in collision
statistics. From Figure 3 it can be seen that this type of
casualty involves the greatest number of ships of all cate-
gories of marine accidents. It is the most frequent and
costly form of multiple-use conflict on the world's oceans.
*The statistics of the Liverpool Underwriters show that
over the period from 1956 to 1969, 33% of the world merchant
fleet, of vessels over 500 gross tons, suffered partial
losses as a result of Borne form of marine accident. Over
the same period, 20.6~ of all vessels damaged were involved
in a collision. Commencing in 1965, the percentage of the
world fleet involved in accidents began to decline; however,
it is disturbing to note that the percentage of damage
resulting from collision has increased slightly. A simple
mathematical calculation shows that, in the long term, some-
where between six and seven percent of the total world fleet
can be expected to be involved in a collision. In light of
the present growth trends, in size and number of merchant
vessels, this is not a very comforting thought.
The concern expressed above is borne out by the fact
that in 1969 collisions resulted in the partial or total
*See Appendix I.
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FIGURE 3
SHIPS OVER 500 GROSS TONS PART rALLY LOST
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loss of 1,669 vessels of over 500 gross tons. 16 This is a
decrease from the post-World War II peak of 1,970 casualties,
which occurred in 1965, and speaks well for the measures
which the maritime community and IMCO have taken to improve
maritime safety. Unfortunately, in terms of tonnage and
ships totally destroyed, it was the worst year on record,
doubling the figure of 1968. 17 Incomplete returns for 1970
indicate a significant reduction, at least in terms of par-
tial losses, however, collisions still acounted for 20.6%
of all damage suffered, right on the 15 year average. 18
Collisions, to a much greater extent than strandings,
are primarily a result of personnel error. Statistics pub-
lished by the U.S. Coast Guard for the period 1 July 1969
to 30 June 1970 show that 232 reporting vessels experienced
casualties as a result of collisions. A total of 735 vessels
were involved, of which 18 were tankers and 38 displaced over
*10,000 gross tons. Considering that it takes at least two
ships to create a collision, it can be seen that the maximum
possible number of collisions in the set is 367. Personnel
fault was assessed as the primary cause in 306 or 8496 of the
*The figures which are quoted here are based on the
sums of two separate collision categories which the Coast
Guard has titled "Collisions; crossing, meeting and
over-taking" and "Collisbn, fog." For the purposes of
this discussion, it makes no difference whether visibility
was good or poor; it is the consequences which are impor-
tant.
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cases. 19 There is no reason to doubt thatthis assessment
of cause should be extrapolated on a world-wide basis.
states which experience a large volume of ship traffic
in the proximity of their coasts are becoming increasingly
alarmed at the high incidence of collisions. Although mas-
sive oil spills from collisions such as that resulting from
the Arizona Standard/Oregon Standard incident are rare,
there is a high potential risk of such an occurrence. A
recent sequence of accidents in the Dover Strait has aroused
grave public concern in the United Kingdom. As a result of
a collision with the Peruvian freighter, Paracas, on 11
January 1971, the unladen Liberian tanke~Texaco Caribbean,
broke in two and sank. FollOWing this initial incident, two
additional vessels, the Brandenburg and the Nikki, struck
the submerged wreckage and were also sunk. In all, 53 per-
sons lost their lives within a three week period. Had the
18,000 dwt Texaco Caribbean been fully laden, serious pollu-
tion would also have resulted. 20 This unfortunate series
of accidents has aroused strong sentiments in the British
Parliament to compel vessels transiting the English Channel
to comply with the routing schemes which presently exist
there regardless of their nationality.21
Admittedly,_ the Dover Strait is a special case, both in
term~ of geography and traffic density. In fact, the entire
.
marine region of northwestern Europe from the Dover Strait
26
past the Hook of Holland to the entrance of the Kiel Canal
supports the greatest volume of seaborne traffic anywhere
in the world. It has been shown that close to 60% of all
collisions occur in those waters, of which 5% of the total
occur on the open sea. 22 Figure 4 shows the distribution
of collisions which occurred in the Strait in the three year
period between 1 January 1967 and 31 January 1971. The con-
centration on the English side is noteworthy.
A review of casualty statistics assembled by the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Liverpool Underwriters shows that colli-
sion is no stranger to the waters adjacent to the United
States. 33 Approximately 15% of the world's total occur in
these waters; of which number some 15% occur in the open sea.
Comparison of these figures with those of northwestern Europe
shows that, of the total number of collisions occurring in
each area, the proportion of those which occur on the open
sea is three times greater in American waters. Several
spectacular collisions, many of which have involved large
passenger liners, have occurred on the high seas approaches
to New York. Fortunately, in recent history none has resulted
in the huge loss of life that was potential in the situation,
even though one ship or the other was totally destroyed. In
two fairly recent cases, the danger was heightened considerably
27
FIGURE 4-
DISTRIB~ION OF COLLJ;.SIONS IN THE DOVER STRAIT
Source: J.H. Beattie, "Collisions in ~he Dover Strait."
Presented to a Meeting of the Institute of Navigation, (London:
3 February 1971), oiting Lloyd's Casualty Statistics.
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as a result of one of the vessels being a tanker.*
British maritime safety officials have expressed a
belief that it may be necessary to impose positive traffic
control on vessels transiting the Dover Strait. 25 In as
much as there exists no precedent for implementing such a
scheme in international waters, the thought raises the pos-
sibility of Britain and France extending the limits of their
territorial seas to 12 miles and terminating the high seas
status of this busiest of all international waterways. Un-
less the collision rate, which now averages one per month,26
1s significantly reduced, public reaction may force these
governments into taking such action.
Once again, as in the case of public reaction to strand-
1ngs, the ocean transportation industry is running the risk
of navigation restrictions as a result of unilateral govern-
ment action. This possibility is also implicit in the
"Declaration of Latin American States on the Law of the Sea,"
in Lima, 8 August 1970. The perception of a threat can be
a highly subjective judgement on the part of the coastal
state. Maritime operators should need little incentive to
take whatever measures are necessary to permanently reverse
*Some of the more spectacular collisions which involved
passenger liners were those between the liners Stockholm
and Andria Doria, July 1956; liner Santa Rosa and tanker
Valchem, March 1959; aRd liner Shalom and tanker· stolt
Bagii, November 1964. 2
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''-"' the unacceptable long-term trend in collision statistics.
After all, it is they who are the biggest long-term losers.
Shipping and Offshore Structures. Statistically speak-
ing, the problem of vessel collisions with offshore oil
structures 'is a minor one compared to stranding and ship-
ship collisions. Geographically speaking, only the Gulf of
Mexico presents a problem of significant concern to maritime
safety officials and ship operators. Nevertheless, the
. *Coast Guard, American Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS) ,
and shipping underwriters have branded offshore oil struc-
tures as navigation hazards. 27
Coast Guard statistics show an average of about three
collisions per year between ships and offshore structures
in the Gulf of Mexico. Figures are based only upon reported
accidents which means that those involving foreign vessels
beyond the limit of the territorial sea are not- included.
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It is difficult to say how many accidents such as that which
involved the Greek Freighter, Olympic Flame, on 19 October
1970 would add to the overall statisticS.29 Considering
that over 300 deep draft ships operate daily out of Gulf
ports and that over 75% of them are foreign, one can only
conclude that the Coast Guard statistics are conservative.
*Formerly the American Merchant Marine Institute (AMMI).
30
,-. Oil recovery operations first moved off shore in 1947
in the Gulf of Mexico. At first they presented no problem
to the mariner; in fact, oil structures were welcomed by
local seamen as a form of aid to navigation. Technology
limited them to shallow water and they were, therefore, no
threat to large ocean-going vessels. The honeymoon was
short-lived for several reasons. The principle ones were
the push into deeper water, which improving technology per-
mitted, and the appearance of mobile platforms which are
used for exploratory drilling. Stationary platforms permit-
ted the mariner to familiarize himself with the hazards in
a particular area. The mobile platform was a will-o-the-
wisp, disappearing from one spot and appearing in another
between the departure and return of a ship on a single
voy~ge.30 They were particularly bothersome to foreign
vessels which, more often than not, lacked appropriate
Notices to Mariners and up-tO-date navigation charts.
With the passage of the Submerged Lands Act31 and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act32 in 1953, the push into
deeper water was accelerated. Federal jurisdiction, which
had previously been somewhat uncertain, was extended to all
structures or "artificial islands" on the continental shelf
for the purpose of navigational safety. The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers was empowered to restrict the erection of struc-
~-
tures which 'jould constitute a navigational hazard. The
31
u.s. Coast Guard was given the authority to prescribe its
"Rules and Regulations for Artificial Islands and Fixed
Structures on the Outer Continental Shelf," by which it
prescribes light and sound signals to be carried to warn
Shipping.34 The Corps of Engineers, after discussions with
concerned interests, established structure-free lanes or
"fairways" at the approaches to major Gulf ports in order
to provide safe access for shipping. Despite the legisla-
tion and actiVities of government agencies, Gulf shippers
find themselves, today, in a position where coastwise ship-
ping must make wide deviations to seaward to avoid the
*hazards of offshore structures.
Setting aside the ship-structure collision, which is
only regionally significant at the present time, one should
be able to look at the broader problem in its developing
perspective. At its root is encroachment, by offshore
reso~ce exploiters, on large navigable areas of the sea
so as to make them unusable or hazardous for shipping. If
uncontrolled, the process creates a condition whereby vessels
must maneuver deviously to approach a port or round a head-
land. As a minimum, this results in lost time and significant
dis-economies for ship operators over the long term. Given
heavy ship traf~ic and frequent poor visibility, the results
*See the discussion in AppendiX II.
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are as likely to be sunk or damaged ships and oil rigs. As
pointed out in Chapter I, this raises a considerable threat
of coastal pollution due to large oil spills from damaged
ships or oil platforms.
The growth rate of these structures creates the greatest
alarm in shipping circles. Over the period from 1961 to
1969, the rate at which new wells were completed off the
U.S. coast increased from a little over 500 to over 1200
per year. At the present time there are over 8000 oil plat-
forms in the Gulf of Mexico alone and over 16,000 estimated
world-wide. 35 Producing wells exist out to nearly 100 miles
from shore in up to 340 feet of water. 36 The pace is in-
creasing allover the globe and is expected to continue as
the world's energy demands deplete onshore resources. Figure
5 identifies some of the most promising offshore oil areas.
Based on existing shipping patterns, one might predict con-
flict in the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, East China Sea,
Indonesia, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as well as off the
coasts of the southwestern United States, South Africa,
eastern Canada, and the northeastern United States. The
potential magnitude and complexity of the problem can be
seen by referring to Figure 6, which is a map of oil explora-
tion leases which have been granted off eastern Canada.
Should these prove to be fruitful deposits, they. will bring
shipping, oil, and fishing together in one of all time great
33
FIGURE 5 I.
_EROMISING OFFSHORE OIL AREAS
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FIGURE 6
OIL EXPLORATION LEASES - EAST COAST OF CANADA
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~. use conflicts. The prospect of trying to develop a workable
accommodation which involves multi-nation distant water
fishing fleets, international shipping, and Canadian and
American oil interests boggles the imagination.
It is perhaps appropriate at this point in time to look
upon this relatively new form of multi-use conflict as adding
a new dimension to the problem of maritime safety, much like
the advent of the steamship did about a hundred years ago.
In other words, while it has not yet developed into crisis
proportions, the existence of a growing number of man-made
navigation hazards in or near busy shipping routes and port
approaches has the potential for creating a serious problem.
It is clear that an acceptable form of accommodation must be
internationally acceptable and that it should be arrived at
prior to the generation of a crisis. Both the offshore
operators and the shipping interests should know the rules
of the game as they invest in their respective technologies.
The discussion has properly centered on the shipping-
oil conflict, which is the only aspect of this class of con-
flict of current concern. Other versions are on the horizon,
however, and should be considered in the same context. Off-
shore operations such as hard mineral recovery and underwater
habitats also contain the elements for spatial conflict with
shipping operators. It seems unlikely that they·will ~equire
anything near the level of effort which must be exerted in
36
~. the case of offshore oil, at least for the foreseeable
future, and a workable management scheme for the latter
should be equally applicable to them.
Trends. What of the future? Will the problems go
away if nothing is done, or will they grow worse? To answer
this question, one need but look at the trends in the two
major elements--ocean transportation and offshore oil.
Table I shows the growth by year of world international
seaborne trade.
TABLE I
DEVELOPMENT OF WORlD INTERNATIONAL
SEABORNE TRADE, 1959-1968
TANKER CARGO TOTAL CARGO
Year Metric tons, %change Metric tons, %change
millions from last millions from last
year year
1959 480 9 970 5
1960 540 13 1080 11
1150 61961 580 7 91962 650 12 1250
1350 81963 710 9 121964 790 11 1510 91965 870 10 1640 81966 950 9 1770 51967 1020 7 18602050 101968 1120 10
Source: United Nations, COnferenceton1§69deT~/~/C
Development, Review of Maritime Transpor , •
4/66 (New York: 1969), p. 3.
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During the period from 1959 through 1968 trade developed
at a rate of 8.3% per year in terms of tonnage of all goods
loaded. Tanker loadings increased at an average annual rate
of 9.7%. Grovnh has been steady and most experts predict
that it will continue that way for the foreseeable future.
For the United States, it is estimated that total waterborne
foreign trade will more than quadruple from 1970 to the year
2000, growing from 391 to 1,252 long tons. 37
In anticipation of this growth, shipbuilders have fore-
cast tonnage requirements through 1980, as shown in Table II.
It is interesting to note that in 1969, when these forecasts
were made, the predicted tanker deadweight tonnage for 1970
was 127.8 million. According to Lloyd's of London, the
amount of tonnage actually registered in 1970 was 148.5
million tons. 38
TABLE II
MAXIMUM PROJECTED WORLD FLEET TONNAGE,
1970, 1975, and 1980(Million deadweight tons at year end)
.,
YEAR TANKERS DRY CARGO VESSELS TOTAL
1970 127.8 157.5 285.3
1975 193.8 211.3 405.1
1980 289.7 384.3 574.0
Source: United Nations, Conference on Trade and/
Development, Review of Maritime Transport, 1969,TD/B c.
4/66 (New York: 1969), p. 15.
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'~ The nature of the world fleet is changing rapidly also.
Most significant is the appearance of a growing number of
giant tankers. These superships, or "oilbergs" as some
have described them, are capable of carrying over 200,000
tons of liquid cargo. As of 15 February there were 61 such
vessels in the world fleet and 294 were on current order. 39
Projections for 1980 call for tankers which will displace
one million dwt., and be a quarter of a mile long. When one
considers that the Torrey Canyon was only one tenth the
displacement of one of these monsters, it is not too diffi-
cult to foresee the magnitude of the consequences which
would result should one be destroyed in coastal waters.
It is clear that the trend in volume of ocean trade is
increasing and that the tonnage of the world fleet will grow
to accommodate it. Shipping technology will also change as
seen in the developments in the tanker field. Specialized
ship configurations such as a LASH and containerships will
concentrate traffic at major ports and along specific routes.
Large investments in these new vessels and in the port facil-
ities to handle them will place greater emphasis on maintain-
ing schedules, giving rise to greater speeds and perhaps more
calculated risks on the part of masters. 40 Obviously,
factors for increasing conflict and risk are plentiful.
The trends in offshore oil exploitation have been
adequately covered and need no further discussion. It-is
39
sufficient to mention here that in the next 20 years the
free world energy demand will be about triple that/of the
past 100 years. vllien taken together with the fact that the
ratio of proven domestic reserves to annual production was
reduced from 13 to 10 in the United States from 1950 to 196771
it is clear alternative sources are necessary. If they exist
in the sea and are exploitable, there will be continued ex-
pansion of offshore activity.
Summar~. Ocean transportation has been identified as
the single common element in all three categories of multiple-
use conflict in offshore areas. It has been shown that des-
pite a host of regulatory and technological measures taken
by the maritime community, the long-term trends in ship-ship
collisions and strandings has steadily moved upward. The
consequences to coastal states, in terms of pollution and
loss of life, are giving rise to thoughts of unilateral
action to restrict vessel movements even in international
waters. It is in the interest of maritime operators to take
the lead in developing adequate measures to control shipping
so as to reduce present casualty trends.
The conflict between shipping and offshore oil exploita-
tion is presently minor in terms of casualties to either
element when compared to the first two categories. The
primary source of contention is competition for unimpe~ed
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use of ocean space. Grm1th trends in shipping and offshore
oil recovery do present a significant potentiaJ." for increased
risk of mutual hazard unless practical measures can be es-
tablished to accommodate both.
Conclusions. The present level of offshore marine
accidents is unacceptable to coastal states. The trends
point to increased potential for such accidents unless pre-
ventive measures are taken.
Vessel routing has been applied, in one way or another,
to address each form of multiple-use conflict and its related
categories of marine accidents. The recent reactions of
pUblic officials to marine accidents indicate a growing
interest in vessel routing schemes, or "Sealanes" as the
author prefers to call them.
The maritime community must take the lead in developing
acceptable and effective "Sealanes" or run the risk of coastal
states taking the initiative and implementing a system which
will be unreasonably prejudicial to shipping interests.
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CHAPTER III
THE CASE FOR MANDATORY "SEAIMJES"
Basic Approach to Conflict Resolution. Unless preven-
tive measures are taken the level and complexity of the
multiple-use conflicts previously discussed will grow. An
acceptable approach to the problem will be one which addres-
ses all three conflict categories and, at the same time,
minimizes the contribution of major causative factors. It
should do so without undue penalty to any particular use and
at minimum cost to coastal states. To be effective it must
be enforceable without discrimination in a manner acceptable
both to the coastal states and to those operating off their
shores. The nature of the conflicts and their tar-reaching
consequences dictates a regime which transcends the boundary
between territorial sea and international waters.
It 1s obvious that the most promising approach toward
accommodation will involve measures to reduce accidents
involving ocean-going vessels. The most desirable measure
or measures will simultaneously address all three categories
of accidents which have been identified: ship-ship colli-
sions, ship-structure collisions, and strandings.
Prevention of Ship-Ship Collisions. Head to head meeting
situations create the greatest danger of collisions be~een
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vessels. Since the relative speeds are the highest in this
situation, it carries with it the greatest potential for
serious damage or loss of li£e. 1 The danger is particularly
significant in poor visibility which increases uncertainty
as to the intentions of the other vessel, thus delaying pre-
ventive action until it is too late.
The obvious approach to prevent this type of accident
is to separate opposing streams of ship traffic widely enough
so as to minimize the chances for head-on encounters. This
conclusion was first reached in 1855 by Lt. Matthew Fontaine
Maury of the U.S. Navy. It led to the first North Atlantic
Track Agreement in 1898 which separated opposing streams of
vessels crossing the North Atlantic. 2 Commencing in 1911,
separate ftupbound" and "downbound" courses were established
in the Greak Lakes and, more recently, several coastal states
have implemented a series of !MCa approved "TraffiC Separa-
tion Schemes.,,3
It is safe to say that the maritime community is general-
ly agreed that a form of vessel routing or traffic separation
is needed to reduce the frequency of collisions. Unfortun-
ately, it has not been so consistent in its support for
implementing compulsory schemes which are needed to ensure
the success of this approach.
43
Prevention of Stranding. Most stranding incidents occur
in congested harbors and narrow channels, however, 3tatistics
compiled by the U.S. Coast Guard show that over 13% occur in
the open ocean. 4 It is the latter which result in the great-
est loss, primarily because the vessel is likely to break up
due to tide and wave action. The principle cause has been
shown to be personnel error, particularly in open water. 5
Some of the more specific factors are sloppy navigation,
lack of local knowledge, adverse weather, and unknown tide
and current effects. To these can be added a growing ten-
dency on the part of masters to take calculated risks in
order to meet schedules, and a deterioration in their general
competence to handle today1s larger and faster vessels. 6
There are several steps which might be taken to reduce
the frequenc:y of strandings such as improved aids to naviga-
tion, more effective dissemination of information on local
navigation hazards, and better tide and current information.
These steps do not address the competency of the master, his
willingness to take risks nor adverse weather.
Since the coastal state should have the most complete
knowledge of all factors affecting navigation safety off
its coast, it should be in a position to develop routes
which, if followed, would ensure safe passage of vessels
under all conditions. If adherence was compulsory, and the
d uate to guarantee-theexisting aids to navigation were a eq
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mariner's ability to use them in all weather, they should
virtually eliminate strandings such as that of the Torrex
Canyon.
Prevention of Vessel-Structure Collisions. The recovery
of offshore resources will continue to grow. The mariner,
albeit grudgingly, has come to realize this as a fact of
life. He realizes that the sea is no longer solely his
domain and that he is on the defensive against the encroachers.
Accommodation is inevitable and with every accommodation the
mariner will be the one who is giving up something which has
always been his--navigable ocean space. The main thrust of
his activities will be to preserve the maximum possible
amount of structure-free water along major sea routes and
at the approaches to ports. He will resist being constrained
to areas which will not accommodate growth in the size and
speed of his ships. He will also resist being forced to
follow circuitous routes such as presently existin the Gulf
of Mexico, or routes which are not serviced by adequate aids
to navigation.?
Oil exploration is expensive and the location of produc-
tive deposits uncertain. For these reasons oil interests
will insist on the widest possible latitude in carrying out
their offshore operations. They will resist attempts to
close off areas of the continental shelf which look pr?mising
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prior to having suru{ test wells from mobile rigs. Also,
having determined that oil does e..Lst in an area, they will
press for drilling rights even in heavily traveled shipping
routes.
At the present time international law does not assign
primacy in use o£ the sea to either o£ these two competing
uses. The main instrument which addresses this form of
conflict is the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 8 Article
5 (2) authorizes coastal states to erect structures on the
continental shelf and to establish safety zones which must,
under Article 5 (3), be observed by ships of all nationali-
ties. Article 5 (1) makes a very subjective statement to
the effect that exploration and exploitation shall not cause
"unjustifiable tr interference with navigation, without quali-
fication. The only apparent support in favor of the shipping
industry is contained in Article 5 (6) which prohibits off-
shore installations where "••• Interference may be caused
to the use of recognized sealanes essential to international
navigation." But here again the statement is caveated with
sUbjective terms such as "recognized" and "essential." The
question is: who is authorized to interpret these terms?
Are there any recognized trsealanes?"
At this poi~t in time it appears as though the interpre-
tation is made by the coastal state, as has been done by the
United states in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Santa Barbara
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Channel, and as is about to be done by the United Kingdom
*in the North Sea. So far no one has challenged this assUmp-
tion of authority to take unilateral actions which have such
an obvious impact on international shipping.
The approach which is apparently developing to resolve
this form of use conflict has two distinct objectives; that
of preventing ship collisions with structures that already
exist; and that of preventing the emplacement of structures
which will unjustifiably impede navigation. Both objectives
are served by a form of vessel routing called Shipping Safety
Fairways.10 In the first case, vessels are routed around
those structures which already exist. In the second case,
pre-determined vessel routes are to be kept clear of struc-
tures to prevent future hazard. As with all other existing
, routing schemes, adherence to these schemes by masters is
voluntary.
Mandatory Sealanes - the Logical Answer. It is quite
clear that vessel routing schemes, if properly developed and
adhered to, have the potential to significantly reduce all
*The Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom has
proposed to the Board of Trade a series of "clearwaystt
off the east coast of Britain, which are recommended to
be kept free of offshore structures. This approach very
much resembles the system of Shipping Safety Fairways
which exist in the Gulf of Mexico, except that they will
not be overprinted on navigational charts, at least for
the present.~
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~ ·forms of marine accidents which have been previously dis-
cussed. The fact that such schemes are already in use has
*been mentioned, though only in passing. It is safe to say
that, until recently, there had been no effort to standardize
on vessel routing schemes nor to require masters of vessels
to adhere to them. Those which presently exist vary widely
in structure and application. In some cases, where they
have been implemented to resolve one particular limited type
of conflict, they have succeeded in creating another.
What is required in order to effectively address the
problem of marine accidents is a standardized system of
"Sealanes" which combines traffic separation, safe routes
through natural and man-made hazards, and security from en-
croachment by competing users of ocean space. The term
"Sealanes" has been deliberately chosen ovi:» others such
as Traffic Separation Scheme or Shipping Safety Fairway.
The principle reason for this is that the language of Article
5 (6) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf uses it,
albeit undefined, in addressing the problem of conflict
between shipping and the exploitation of shelf resources.
No other descriptive terms are used in any of the applicable
*The details of the development and structure of
vessel routing ~chemes are discussed in Appendix II.
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~ conventions dealing with shipping problems.*
It might be appropriate to merely classify Shipping
Safety Fairways, Traffic Separation Schemes, and others as
forms of "Sealanes" for purposes of international law. The
main point is that they must be given some legal status both
for the purpose of protecting them from encroachment and to
provide a means for requiring their observance by masters.
It is the position of the author that "Sealanes" will only
be successful in reducing marine accidents if adherence to
theD) is made compulsory at least by some classes of vessels,
particularly those which by virtue of their size, speed, or
nature of cargo pose a major threat to the well-?eing of
coastal inhabitants. Perhaps even more importantly, ALL
vessels which operate within "Sealanes" must be compelled
to adhere to lane discipline.
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CRAPI'ER IV
RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH SEALAl\1ES
The Involvement of IMCO. Commencing in May 1967, the
first in a series of modern Sealane Systems was implemented
by the U.S. Coast Guard at the approaches to the Port of New
York. This was followed one month later by a traffic separa-
tion scheme in the Strait of Dover. 1 Both of these schemes
have several things in common: (1) they are approved by
IMCO; (2) they incorporate traffic separation; (3) they con-
form to standards laid down by !MCO; (4) they are overprinted
on regular navigation charts; (5) they are served by adequate
aids to navigation; and (6) they are merely recommended
*routes with no legal status in international law. The
purpose of these and many other vessel routing schemes which
have since been adopted by IMeO is to,
• • • produce an orderly flow of traffic for the
purpose of reducing the risk of collisions and/or
strandings, mainly in ar~as of converging routes
or high traffic density.
IHCO is the only internationa1. body with responsibility
for estab1.ishing and recommending, on an internationa1. leve1.,
vessel routing schemes or areas to be avoided by certain
*The development and structure of these schemes
is discussed in Appendix II.
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classes of vessels. The principles which underly its approval
of schemes, proposed by member governments, are contained in
its publication, "Ship's Routing and Traffic Separation
Schemes,"* which is now in its second edition.' !MCa recog-
nizes the multiple-use conflicts and the trends which have
been discussed in earlier chapters. The schemes which it
has approved so far incorporate features which simultaneously
address the maritime safety aspects of all forms of conflict,
and it is hoped that this will continue to be the case.
The Question of Effectiveness. A natural question to be
asked is whether or not this new approach has any hope of
success where so many others have failed. What'are its
weaknesses? Do masters comply with the recommended schemes?
Can IMCQ-approved schemes be encroached upon? Has there been
a reduction of shipping accidents since the various schemes
were implemented?
Problems of Non-compliance. In a s~~ey conducted by
the U.S. Coast Guard in 1968 it was determined that 90% of
the 250 masters who responded always used the Sealanes whep
approaching the Port of New York. Eight percent used them
*This publication may be procured from the Publication
Section, Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion 101-104 Piccadily, London, WIV OAE, England. A gooddisc~ssion is also contained in H.O. 1400, "Pilot Chart of
the North Atlantic," February 1971.
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part of the time and two percent stated they did not use them
at all. 4 The greatest single complaint was that other ves-
sels were not complying with lane discipline. One third of
those who responded to the questionnaires urged that the
Sealanes should be made compulsory, even though this question
was not specifically asked of them. Surveys have also been
conducted in the Strait of Dover to determine the degree of
compliance there. One such survey, conducted by the British
government, showed 10% of the vessels in the Strait traveling
against the normal flow of traffic in the routing scheme. 5
Such statistics have not been reported for other Sealane
systems, however, many masters have pointed to ~assenger
and cargo vessels as major violators of lane discipline in
the Persian Gulf area and off western Europe. 6 It would
appear from most indications, on both sides of the Atlantic,
that about 9 out of 10 masters are complying with recommended
routes which have been approved by IMeo.
The Problem of Encroachment. Two principle activities
exist which might encroach upon established Sealanes. These
are oil recovery, which has been previously discussed, ana
commercial fishing.
To date oil has made no attempt to move into IMCO
approved schemes. The most likely areas in which this type
of controversy might erupt in the near future are in the
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Santa Barbara Channe~where Sealanes traverse a rapidly
developing oil recovery area, and in the North Sea. IMca
recognizes that the U.S. failure to take early action in the
Gulf of Mexico has created a potentially dangerous situation.
Accordingly, the General Assembly of IMCO, in October 1969,
adopted a resolution calling upon member states to ensure
the existence of unobstructed shipping routes and sea
approaches through offshore recovery areas at all stages
of exploitation. Action is to be taken to implement routing
schemes at an early stage, taking into account principles
adopted by IMCO. 7 The rights of governments to exploit the
resources of their shelf is recognized by a proyision for
adjusting established routing systems as necessary.8 The
strength of this resolution remains to be demonstrated.
The problem of encroachment upon Sealanes by commercial
fishermen and pleasure boaters already exists and may well
be more difficult for IMCO to address, let alone remedy.
The first notable incident within U.S. Sealanes occurred in
May 1967. The S.S. Christoforo Colombo, enroute to New York,
encountered a fleet of Russian trawlers operating in the .
inbound lane.9 This ve~sel was forced to maneuver continu-
ously to avoid numerous small vessels, not all of which were
Russian. Since there was a dense fog at the time, the acci-
dent potential was quite high. Similar complaints have been
received from the other side of the Atlantic, where suggestions
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have even been made to restrict fishermen from operating
in Sealanes. 10 The impracticality of such a suggestion is
obvious, given the freedom of fish to move about without
regard to man's artificial boundaries. Nevertheless, in
the view of the Coast Guard, some solution is required. The
obstruction of Sealanes by fishing vessels and pleasure
craft remains as the most serious problem being encountered
by vessels using them in the approaches to U.S. ports. 11
Pleasure craft are operated by a rapidly expanding popula-
tion of what constitutes the most immature and unmanageable
group of seafarers on the world's oceans. If they had the
best of intentions, it is unlikely that they co~ld navigate
with sufficient accuracy to remain out of Sealanes, even if
they knew they existed. The problem is somewhat mitigated
by the fact that they seldom travel far out to sea and are
thus encountered in more or less predictable locations. In
addition, they are: (1) indigenous to the coastal state and
thus somewhat controllable; (2) maneuverable so that they
can usually avoid danger at the last moment; and (3) unbe-
lievably lucky. Most encounters can be expected to end uP.
with nothing worse than a badly frightened ship's master,
provided he has maneuvering room and there are no other
large ships about.
With commercial fishing vessels the problem is more
significant. There exists a large growing fleet of distant
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water fishing vessels, international in character, often
quite large and comprising a significant financial invest-
ment. As has been shown, they can be encountered an~lhere
on the high seas where fish are present. When engaged in
fishing operations their maneuverability is restricted.
This is recognized by Rule 26 of the International Rules
for Preventing Collision at Sea, 1960, which requires all
other vessels, except those not under effective control, to
remain clear. If this rule is applied rigidly to vessels
which are proceeding in recognized Sealanes, much of their
value in reducing the collision hazard will have been lost.
This will be particularly true when the non-fishing vessel
is forced into maneuvering close to the opposite lane as
was the Cristoforo Colombo.
Effectiveness of Sealanes in Reducing Accidents. At
this point in time no "expert" will step forward and point
to the success of Sealanes in reducing shipping accidents.
There are too many factors involved in present accident
statistics such as growth trends in shipping and deteriorating
capabilities of masters, particularly those of the growing
"flag of convenience" fleets. The first place to look for
significant improvement is in the Strait of Dover, which
has had such a poor long-term record. There are those who
claim that vessel routing has indeed resulted in fewe~
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accidents in the Strait. 12 Others deny it vehemently,
pointing to indefensible caveats used by proponents in
qualifying their conclusions. 13 The Q~qualified fact of
the matter is that for the 44 months before and a~ter the
Dover Strait scheme was implemented the collision rate has
been about constant. The best that has been said for it is
that the number of accidents per fog day has been reduced.
Despite conflicting views on the success of the present
scheme, all agree that separation is necessary. It is only
the mechanics of the system which is the subject of contro-
versy. The Coast Guard has pointed out that no collisions
have occurred within the Sealanes which it has established.
Its confidence in the concept is well founded on the long-
term success of the traffic separation schemes which were
established in the Great La.1;:es. 14
.
As pointed out in the discussion in Chapter II, there
was a change in stranding trends starting in 1967. The time
frame is too short to determine whether or not this is a
long-term change attributable to vessel routing. Neverthe-
less, it did commence with the year following the implemen~
tation of the original schemes. Unfortunately, overall
collision statistics have not yet taken an identifiable
downward turn.
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Weaknesses in Present Sch(;mes. Setting aside differ-
ences of opinion over the physical structure of particular
traffic separation schemes, the overwhelming majority of
those who have been involved with them support their need.
The support of ship's masters was established at an early
point in time by the Institute of Navigation15 and has been
verified by several administrations. Indeed, it has been
the administrations which have taken the more conservative
approach, especially with regard to compulsory use of
Sealanes. 16 This being the cas8, why have they not been
more effective in reducing the number of collisions?
The author contends that experience in the Strait of
Dover clearly proves that even as little as 10% non-compli-
ance by vessels operating in a Sealane can render it incapable
of meeting its objective. In fact, one might even consider
.
the situation worse than no Sealane at all. Those who do
comply might well be lulled into a false sense of security
and, thus, not be as alert as they should for oncoming ves-
sels.
It is obvious that the lack of authority to enforce
mandatory compliance with lane discipline has weakened the
effectiveness of the Sealane concept. It is, perhaps, not
realistic or necessary to require all vessels to use estab-
lished Sealanes. It is, however, both realistic and necessary
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to require all vessels which operate within them to comply
with rules meant to ensure safety of navigation.
The fact that Sealanes are not presently protected
from encroachment by fishing vessels and pleasure craft is
another very significant weakness, and one which will be
difficult to remedy. Article 1 (1) of the Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas17 and Article 2 (2) of the Convention on the High seas18
will limit the actions which the coastal state may take to
keep fishing vessels from operatine in the Sealanes which
it establishes beyond its territorial sea. The author knows
of no provision in conventions dealing with the Law of the
Sea which addresses this problem, other than Rule 26 of the
Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea, 1950, which
restrains fishing vessels from obstructing "fairways" which
are used by vessels other than fishing vessels. Had the
term "Sealane" or "vessel routing scheme" been used there
would be some basis for resolving the conflict.
Present schemes do not address the problem of crossing
traffic adequately. Under the existing International Re~a­
tions for Preventing Collision at Sea, a vessel proceeding
in accordance with the prescribed traffic pattern may be
forced to give ~ay to vessels crossing the lane. Under con-
ditions where there is heavy crossing traffic, it could well
be forced out of the lane in carrying out prescribed maneuvers.
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This is precisely the point which has been at issue in the
controversy between the Trinity House and the United Kingdom
Board of Trade. 19 The problem is exacerbated by the trend
toward increased size and reduced maneuverability of giant
vessels. Furthermore, while the vessel crossing a Sealane
system is aware of the possibility of oncoming traffic,
those which are in it may not be quite as alert to impending
crossing situations. This can be a factor of significance
in areas like the Strait of Dover where so much cross-
channel traffic exists.
Problems also exist with visual aids to navigation used
to mark vessel routing schemes. As various nations develop
their own Sea1anes they will service them with the bu~yage
and other aids to navigation which have been locally adopted.
At present there exists a wide variety of such systems. They
differ enough so as to make it impractical for the inter-
national maritime community to familiarize itself with all
of them. Of particular concern is the marking of hazards
such as sunken vessels which might exist within a Sealane.
Lack of standardization of this particular aspect of visual
aids to navigation may have contributed to a series of recent
accidents in the Strait of Dover, where entirely different
systems of buoyage exist on the French and British sides.
20
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Recent Actions of the United Kingdom. Is 90% compliance
adequate to insure the success of traffic separation schemes?
The government of the United Kingdom thinks not. It analyzed
40 collisions which occurred in the English Channel after the
implementation of vessel routing in 1967. Seventeen of them
involved vessels which were clearly in the wrong lane. 21 In
other words, of the total analyzed, nearly half the accidents
were caused by that 10% of the total vessel population which
failed to comply with lane discipline. One of these was the
Peruvian freighter, Paracas, which has been previously men-
tioned in connection with the sinking of the tanker, Texaco
Caribbean, and the disastrous sequence of accidents which
followed early in 1971. 22 Collisions have not been the only
form of casualty which resulted from non-use of the approved
routing scheme. The Liberian tanker, Panther, grounded in
the Strait of Dover on 8 March 1971. She leaked only a small
amount of oil, but was barely pulled free before she broke
her back. 23 This grounding would never have occurred had
she not been well outside the established traffic lane. 24
Recognizing that non-compliance with Sealane discipl~ne
is the major factor in degrading their effectiveness, the
United Kingdom moved in March 1971 to correct this weakness.
It presented a resolution to the 23rd Session of the Maritime
Safety Committee (}ffiC) of IMCO, 15-19 March 1971, calling for
member governments to make it an offense for vessels carrying
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their flag to proceed against the established flow of traffic
in the Dover Strait. This was the first proposal ever pre-
sented to IMCO to compel vessels to adhere to Sealane
discipline. It was amended, at the urging of the United
States Delegation, to include all !}~O-approved routing
schemes. The amended proposal was unanimously approved,
with a minimum of debate, by the r~c.25 It has been recom-
mended for adoption by all IMCO member governments. This
action by IMCa is strongly supported by the International
Chamber of Shipping (ICS) which represents over half of
world shipping tonnage. rcs has cautioned member governments
that such measures, as they relate to the high seas, are use-
less unless the governments of the world develop means to
ensure compliance. 26
The 23rd Session of MSC addressed some of the other
weaknesses of the present system of vessel routing schemes
by: (1) recommending that the International Association of
Lighthouse Authorities (lALA) extend the scope of ongoing
studies to include the problem of unifying buoyage in inter-
national waters, especially for marking wrecks and other
hazards; (2) improving the dissemination of navigational
warnings to shipping; and (3) by instructing its Working
Group on Revision of Collision Regulations to consider the
inclu~ion of rules compelling observance of approved traffic
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separation schemes. 27 The problem of encroachment remains
to be squarely addressed.
Summary. The world maritime community and interested
coastal states are alert to the consequences of multiple-use
conflict over the continental shelf. Attempts are being
undertaken through IMca to standardize both the structure
and application of vessel routing schemes. Several weak-
nesses exist in the present system, primarily because many
of the related conventions which have been adopted have been
drafted and approved as though they were unrelated. Semantic
problems stemming from non-uniform terminology weaken the
interpretation of these conventions as they apply to the
regulation of offshore activities which conflict.
Maritime nations and private interest are aware that
laissez fair~ can no longer be tolerated on the high seas
in the vicinity of coastlines. Accordingly, measures are
being proposed through the international forum provided by
!Mea to regulate more strictly the activities of maritime
operators.
Conclusions. For the first time in documented history
maritime nations and private shipping operators are assuming
the lead in implementing measures which will restrict tradi-
tional aspects of "freedom of the sea." These measures must
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be effective in order to preclude unilateral restrictions
being imposed by coastal states. To be effective, the
international community must develop regimes which will
permit their enforcement regardless of the limitations of
national jurisdiction.
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CHAPTE,."1, V
F:lOBL""lIS TO BE SOLVED
Introduction. It has been argued that Sealanes can be
a useful device in resolving multiple-use conflict on the
continental shelf. It has also been argued that in order
to be effective those who operate within them must be com-
pelled to adhere to applicable procedures. Some vessels.
by the nature of their potential for creating hazards or
dis-economies for third parties. must be required to use
routing schemes which have been adopted by !Meo. Prior to
achieving these goals some problems remain to be worked out.
The author does not presume to be learned enough in
all of the various ramifications to propose acceptable solu-
tions to the many problems which surround effective implemen-
tation of compulsory Sealanes. There are some areas which
can be pointed out which deserve the attention of those who
are.
Problems in Application. The first and most important
step has been taken to compel adherence to prescribed rules
for vessels operating within a routing scheme. The next
step. where pollution prevention is concerned. is to require
certain classes of vessels. for example tankers. to use
adopted routes. This problem has not yet been addressed but
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it cannot be avoided. It has already been pointed out that
stranding is the greatest cause of total loss and has
contributed more to coastal pollution than has collision
between vessels. V~ndatory compliance will also be an
absolute necessity for vessels proceeding through areas
which are densely populated with offshore oil structures.
Major tanker operators have realized the advantages in com-
plying and have instructed their masters to follow approved
routes. 1
It appears sensible at this point in time to amend the
International Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea,
1960, so as to require all vessels within a scheme to comply
with prescribed traffic flow and for certain classes of
vessels to be required to use adopted schemes.
The structure of Sealanes, as approved by IMCO, has
failed to address the crossing problem. Apparently, this
has been left to the existing International Regulations for
Preventing Collision at Sea, 1960. The consequences of this
deficiency may not show up until more significant problems,
such as compulsory adherence and mandatory use, are ironed
out. Nevertheless, the crossing problem exists now and may
well be a significant factor in those collisions in the
Strait of Dover which have not been attributed to vessels
running counter to prescribed traffic flow.
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A system of "controlled" crossing zones is required in
areas such as the Strait of Dover. Crossing vessels must
be compelled to enter Sealanes at minimum prescribed angles,
preferably at designated crossing points. Canada has ad-
dressed this problem in its recent Sealane proposal to IMCO. 2
It is the Canadian government's intention to strictly control
junctions and areas where routes cross so as to prevent
"Stray" crossings.3 This may inconvenience some mariners,
but if adhered to it should improve the workability of the
scheme. It is not enough, however. The International Regu-
lation for Preventing Collision at Sea must be amended so as
to give primacy to vessels which are proceeding in a Sealane
over those that would cross. The concept of "burdened
vessel" should be amended such that crossing vessels are
automatically "burdened" and, therefore, required to give
way. Such a departure from the age-old rule of giving way
only to a vessel on the starboard hand will meet with fierce
resistance from the conservative maritime community. If
they can accept the concept of compulsory Sealanes, they
should be able to see the need for respecting the rights
of those who use them.
The problem of encroachment by fishing vessels has the
potential for creating some serious accidents in which the
fisherman is more apt to be the loser. A workable solution
would seem to be one which permits the fishermen to operate
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within a traffic separation scheme provided that they move
in a direction consistent with the prescribed fiow of traf-
fic. They should not be permitted to operate in controlled
crossing areas or route junctions. It should be possible to
amend the Regulations for Preventing Collision at Sea, 1960,
by expanding Rule 26 to include the behavior of fishing
vessels within IMCQ-approved vessel routing schemes.
Problems of Enforcing Compliance. The proposal which
the ~$C has approved calls for member nations to make it an
offense for vessels flying their flag to violate Sealane
discipline.4 The nature of punishing violators is not pre-
scribed nor is there any implication that coastal state:.
may proceed against violators. Indeed, the latter is ex-
pressly prohibited by Article 11 (1) of the Convention on
the High Seas which states that only the flag state or state
-
nationality may proceed against a master for incidents in-
volving navigation or collision.
It is unlikely that the Convention on the High Seas
can be modified to accommodate the need of the coastal state
to protect itself. It would, therefore, be wiser for IMCO
to agree on some specific minimum penalties which flag states
would be required to assess against masters found guilty of
non-compliance where it is required. This approach should
also be applicable to the problem of encroachment by fishing
vessels.
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Given the lack of a firm stand on the part of a flag
state to compel its vessels to adhere to Sealanes, what can
be done? Some thought has been given to encouraging under-
writers to tailor their premiums to reflect the record of
a shipping company or state in complying with schemes. Un-
fortunately, the way the business is run, rates are based
solely upon accident statistics and are applied to a vessel
rather than the master. Thus, underwriting being a competi-
tive business, this form of leverage would be applied after
the fact of an accident. It would be too late to benefit
the offended state or states.
A more likely approach would be for member nations of
IMCa to collectively refuse violators access to their ports.
This form of coercion could be applied to either the master
or the organization for which he works. Such a policy should
be adopted as a formal Resolution by IMCa and proposed to the
General Assembly.
The alternative to effective enforcement of vessel
routing schemes is clearly unacceptable to shipping nations.
Should shipping accidents continue without a clear reversal
in trend, coastal states may well create new regimes by uni-
laterally extending their territorial jurisdiction to the
limit of the continental shelf, including the super-adjacent
waters.
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~. Technological Problems of Enforcement. For the coastal
state, one of the more significant enforcement problems will
be that of pol~cir~ the Sealanes to detect and report viola-
tors. The magnitude of such a job can be appreciated when
one considers t~at the Sealanes leading to the Port of New
York extend 200 miles to sea, well beyond the range of land-
based radar. The cost of this aspect of enforcement can be
quite high and must be considered in the context of the
threat to the coastal area. In order to re-!,lin respect for
the status of Sealanes, they should not be im~Jlemented where
they cannot be kept under some form of surveillance, at least
occasionally.
The problem of standardizing visual aids to navigation
has been mentioned, but there is another aspect to the prob-
lem. In order to be effective when they are needed the most,
Sealanes must be serviced by a system of all-weather aids.
This implies electronic aids in some instances. The cost
of such systems could be quite high and should be considered
when structuring routing schemes. They must have sufficient
dimensions to permit navigators to remain within them, using
available aids. If this is not done it will be difficult to
fault the master who is involved in an accident because he
is in the wrong lane.
The Next Law of the Sea Conference. Many Conventions
exist which relate to the subject of multiple-use conflict.
69
They are not consistent in their views of priorities nor
in the terminology which they employ. It would· be "lise to
review all of them prior to the next Law of the Sea Confer-
ence to determine vnlere they conflict and/or where semantic
problems inhibit their sensible application to real world
problems. Those who attend the preliminary sessions prior
to the Conference I:tight do well to develop an internation-
ally acceptable glossary of all terms relating to Law of
the Sea matters. They should be understandable to the
layman as well as the international la",ryer.
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF VESSEL LOSSES DUE TO COLLISION,
STRANDING, AND CONTACT DAMAGE~ 1956-1969a(Number of Vessels
Year Collision Stranding Contact Total %of TotalC %damageb
Partial Total Partial Total Partial Partial Total Fleet due to
Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Loss Damaged Collision
1956 1506 20 1026 61 1322 7912 163 39.0 19 01
1957 1272 20 960 73 1277 7243 163 34.6 17.5
1958 1368 23 959 56 1413 6857 160 31.3 20.0
1959 1577 22 948 73 1686 7259 181 32.2 21 07
j 1960 1460 19 962 72 1699 7254 171 3202 20.2
1961 1621 23 922 80 1723 7740 189 33.62 20.9
-o 1962 1804 16 925 123 1590 7814 249 33047 23.2\.r.)
1963 1793 40 978 116 1607 7860 254 33.21 22.8
1964 1753 29 1041 108 1512 8317 249 34.61 21.0
1965 1945 25 1038 121 1583 8884 277 36.26 22.0
1966 1768 42 1013 120 1646 9088 312 36.03 19.5
1967 1566 34 848 146 167/+ 8333 337 32.18 18.8
1968 1595 23 909 142 1647 8627 326 32.54 18.5
1969 1624 45 854 107 1359 8024 327 29.21 20.2
1970 1471
-
800
-
1136 7170
-
25.27 20.6
aLosses due to foundering, burning or missing are not included.
bpercent of total vessels damaged which was due to collision.
cPercent of total world fleet damaged from all causes •
. Annual Reports of the Committee, The Liverpool UnderwritersSource:
Association, 1957-1971 (London: 1971), v.p.
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THE HISTORY OF SEALANES
Introduction. The term "Sealanes" can mean different
things to different people. In general, it brings to mind
a system of vessel routing which exists either by design
or because trade patterns dictate that it be so. Sealanes
may be developed for the purpose of separating opposing
traffic streams, in which case they are called Traffic Sep-
aration Schemes; they may be designed to route ships through
or around man-made hazards, in which case they are called
"fairways" or "clearways"; or they may be intended to con-
strain certaic types of vessels to follow minimum risk paths
to avoid natural hazards, in which case they are referred
to as Routing Schemes.
-
For the purpose of the discussion which follows, the
term Sealanes refers to those vessel routing schemes which
have been speci~ically designed to cause vessels to conform
to pre-determined paths. vlhen used without qualification,
the term refers to schemes which perform all three of the
above functions.
It should be pointed out that the term Sealane is used
primarily in the United States to identify only those schemes
which incorporate traffic separation. The IMea does not use
the term at all in describing any of the systems which it
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approves to perform the above functions. IMCO-approved
terminology for international usage was arrived Oat as a
result of a poll conducted by the International Hydrographic
Bureau among its members. IMCO's failure to adopt the term
"Sealanes" is unfortunate. Had it done so, its approved
schemes would have fallen under the protective umbrella of
Article 5 (6) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf.
The difference between "Sealane system" and "traffic sep-
aration scheme " is admittedly semantic; however, semantics
play a sigr~ficant role in matters of law and jurisdiction.
An Old Concept. The concept of sealanes or traffic
separation schemes is not a new one, however, the structure
and applications have gone through many changes. The first
proposal for ship routing was made by Lt. Matthew Fontaine
Maury, of the U.S. Navy, in 1847. On the basis of an ex-
haustive study of weather and current observations from
thousands of ships' log books, Maury developed his "Wind and
Current Charts of the North Atlantic. ,,1 He supplemented
these in 1848 with his "Track Charts," "Pilot Charts," and
"sailing Directions," which recommended, according to
seasonal weather patterns, least time tracks between major
ports. 2 His wc.k was published by the Naval Observatory
and Hydrographical Office, and it is the basis upon which
the U.S. Havy Oceanographic Office produces its current
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series of "Pilot Charts. f1* Th .
. ~e pr~mary goal of this first
attempt at ship routing was to achieve reduced time enroute
rather than safety, and it is claimed to hav8 saved ship
operators millions of dollars per year in trans-Atlantic
crossings.3
The North Atlantic Track Agreement. The first proposal
to separate ship traffic for safety reasons was also made
by Maury in 1855. The advent of steam-powered vessels had
relieved ~hipts masters of the need to follow the previously
developed weather routing schemes, which tended naturally to
separate opposing traffic streams. They preferred, instead,
to use more direct great circle routes which consumed less
time and conserved precious fuel. This practice, however,
increased the probabi~ity of head to head meeting situations.
In the case of ship traffic between northern Europe and
North America, it also meant crossing the Grand Banks of
Newfoundland, all too frequently in thick fog. Thus, the
invention of the steamship, the most significant advance in
ocean technology since man had learned to use the sail cen-
turies earlier, created the situation which led to the
*All of the current series of "PiJot Charts" produced
by the U.S. Navy Oceanographic Office bear the following
inscription, "Founded upon the researches made ~n the early
part of the nineteenth century by Matthew Fonta~ne Maury~
while aervmg as a Lieutenant in the United States Navy.
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Unfortunately, it was weakened by its non-mandatory nature
*and limited participation. The Agreement, which was based
on Maury's work, is still in effect, although the lane
structure has undergone several revisions. The most recent
Atlantic Lane Routes are shown in Figure 7. Recently ship-
ping companies have indicated a desire to abrogate the
Ag~"eement in favor of weather routing, 9 an interesting
reversion to the older Maury concept.
The Great~kes Routing System. The next significant
attempt to reduce ship collisions by means of traffic sep-
aration schemes occurred in the Great Lakes. During the
period frcm 1900 to 1910, 22 vessels were totally lost on
the Lakes due to collisions. 10 As a result, in 1911, the
Lake Carriers' Association established separate upbound and
downbound courses for member vessels on Lakes Huron and
Superior. These were actual prescribed courses to be fol-
lowed, as opposed to the previously described traffic lanes,
11
and were overprinted on charts by the U.S. Lake Survey.
The Lake Superior routes are shown in Figure 8. Since they
*At the time of the Andrea Doria~Stockholm collision
in 1956, neither of the parent steamslip lines was a party
to the North Atlantic Track Agreement. The 1957 House of
Representatives Safety of Life at Sea Study Report stated
that adLerence to the published sealanes would have pre-
vented this tragic accident, which took the lives of 44
persons.
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FIGURE 7
NORTH ATLANTIC TRACK ROUTES
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were devised by the masters of ships engaged in the Great
Lakes trade, they were qUickly accepted by both ·United
States and Canadian operators. 12 Convinced of the success
of this pioneering effort, the Lake Carriers' Association
and the Dominion Marine Association of Canada expanded-the
schemes to Lake Michigan, in 1926; Lake Erie, in 1947;- and
Lake Ontario, in 1949. One of the more interesting aspects
of the Great Lakes scheme is that it was privately conceived
of and implemented in the interests of safety, without the
need for legislative action. The U.S. government has sup-
ported it in various ways: by recognition in Admir2lty
courts; overprinting on Lake Survey Charts; inclusion in
the Great Lakes Pilot; and by citing failure to adhere to
prescribed routes as a causal factor in Coast Guard Marine
Boards of Investigation into collisions.13 The success of
the traffic separation scheme on the Great Lakes is a gen-
erally accepted fact which is borne out by the significant
reduction in the rate of collision since its implementation.
Despite the injection of ocean shipping through the St.
Lawrence Seaway in 1959, and a significant growth in the
volume of normal lake shipping over the years, the decade
from 1954 through 1963 saw only two major ship losses as a
.
result of collision. In both c~ses failure to adhere to
-,-' f t 14prescribed routes was cited as a contribu~~ng ac or.
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~mDRI Routes. World War II led to the next major
requirement for a ship routing scheme. During the war, both
Allied and Axis naval forces extensively mined the waters
of the North Sea, Mediterranean Sea, and Black Sea. As the
tide of battle turned in favor of the Allies, the need for
seaborne traffic increased in these areas. The Allied
navies swept mine-free channels, as traffic patterns dic-
tated, and established buoys and other aids to enable
navigators to ~ocate them. The Royal Navy issued a system
of publications called Northern European and Mediterranean
Routing Instructions (NEMEDRI) which identified swept chan-
nels and contained sailing directions and hydrographic
information to aid mariners in avoiding danger areas. The
system of routes described in these publications became
known as NEMEDRI lanes, obviously taking their name from
the title of the publ!cation. 15
When they were originally conceived the l~RI routes
were not expected to remain in effect indefinitely. Follow-
ing the war, however, it was clear that they must remain in
use until the full extent of the mine threat could be deter-
mined, and adequate mine clearance effected. The magnitude
of the peacetime threat can be appreciated when one considers
that the British alone planted over 76,000 mines on the sea
bottom and that only about 1,600 were known to have been
16 bl-detonated by enemy vessels. To deal with the pro em,
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the Royal !mvy conceived of the International Routing and
Reporting Authority (IRRA), which was composed of naval
representatives of ten nations, including the United States,
Great Britain, and Russia. Until its dissolution in 1963,
IRRA functioned as an international forum in which mine
dangers, mine clearance, and ship routing problems were
discussed. The IRRA was also responsible for promulgating,
to the mariner, ship routing schemes and relevant hydro-
graphic dat~ ill the. form of the NEMEDRI publication, which
is now in its tenth edition. 17
The NEMEDRI lanes served the purpose for which they
were primarily intended, that of minimizing the risk from
mines.* As post-war trade patterns developed, additional
lanes were swept to accommodate a growing volume of seaborne
traffic. Unfortunately, those who established them could
not foresee that they would become virtually a permanent
ship routing scheme, carrying one of the world's greatest
volumes of seaborne traffic. They, therefore, structured
and marked them so as to prOVide mine-safe routes between
major European ports rather than to prevent collisions at
sea. 18 Figure 9 depicts the system of NEI4EDRI lanes which
*Beattie states that explodable mines are still being
recovered, but that the last known mine casualty occurre~
off Forth Holland in 1962. This testifies to the effect~ve­
ness ,)f the NEI-reDRI system when one considers that over 350
ships were lost to mines off Denmark alone after the ~ar.
supra, Ch. 2, n. 9 at 41.
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exists in the Kattegat, between Denmark and Sweden. They
are axially buoyed with the main routes varying "in width
from one to five miles, depending on the traffic volume.
The combination of the previously described grovnh in
shipping volume 2nd a residual mine threat has tended to
create large concentrations of shipping in some of the main
~D~DRI routes. The highest density of traffic exists on
the Borkum and Terschelling route from Rotterdam to the
Kiel Canal. 19 _An e~timated 400 ships per day use this
route and collisions occur as frequently as on any other
water-way in the world, including the infamous Strait of
Dover. 20 Figure 10 shows the location of some 57 collisions
which occurred there between 1959 and 1963. 21 Most of these
occurred in reduced visibility as a result of head to head
meeting situations off the centerline of the lane. Radar
surveys have shown that in poor visibility approximately
10% of the vessels in the lane operate on the wrong side of
the axial line of buoys, against the main flow of traffic. 22
*This apparent failure of vessels to comply with Rule 25 by
remaining on the starboard side of the channel is attributed
to a tendency on the part of masters to sail from buoy to
buoy in poor visibility.24
*The instructions contained in the ~nmRI publication
call for vessels to remain on the starboard side of th~
lane (buovs to port). Additionally, most masters cons1der
the routes as narr-ow channels where Rule 25 "The Narr~w
Channel Rule n would apply. 23
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FIGURE 10
COLLISIONS IN THE NORTH SEA NEMEDRI ROUTES
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The NEMEDRI routing system has successfully met the
safety requirements for which it was established. In doing
so, however, it has contributed to yet another danger, that
of collision at sea. Several factors can be identified as
aggravating the situation. The previously cited tendency
to concentrate traffic in restricted areas is compounded
by a generally agreed-upon deficiency in the capabilities
of many masters. 25 The existing system of aids to naviga-
tion does nEt ~pear to provide sufficient accuracy under
all conditions of visibility. Although most of the area is
covered by Decca Navication System, which can provide suf-
ficient all-weather accuracy, it has been estimated that
only 25% of the vessels entering these waters are equipped
to use it. 26 The location of the systerr of visual aids to
navigation along the center of the lane tends to draw opposing
traffic streams together in poor visibility. Failure to
observe or enforce Rule 25 and the lack of a traffic separa-
tion or buffer zone increases the probability of head to
head meeting situations which have been shown to be the major
category of collision at sea.
In recognition of the increasing th:"eat of collision in
the North Sea, proposals have been developed to widen the
NEMEDRI routes and transform them into traffic separation
schemes. This will call for sweeping new lanes clear of mines
and marking off a buffer zone with parallel lines of cuoys,
as shown in Figure 11.27
"FIGURE 11
MODIFICATION OF BORKill1 - TERSCHELLING NEMEDRI
ROUTE, TO PROVIDE TRAFFIC SEPARATION
Source: IMCO, Ship's Routeing and Traffic Separation
Schemes, (London: IMCO, 1971), p. 280
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Shipping Safety Fai~~ays Systems. The effort to estab-
lish a system of "shipping safety fairways" or "c'Learways"
for shipping actuc~ly pre-dates the better known work of
the Institutes of Navigation of Britain, France, and the
Fede~al Republic of Germany. As a practical matter, however,
"fairwaysl1 were not conceived as vessel routing schemes in
the sense of those previously described. They came into
being as a result of agitation by the shipping industry,
whicll per-ce Ived a gr.-owing encroachment, by the oil industry,
on ocean space that had previously been its virtually uncon-
tested domain. They were not originally meant to route
vessels safely through existing navigation hazards, but,
rather, to set aside ocean areas which would be maintained
free of man-made hazards, specifically offshore drilling
*platforms.
As early as August 1948, the American Merchant Marine
Institute (AMMI), alarmed at the potential navigation hazard
posed by offshore oil platforms, objected to the possible
issuance of a blanket permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers to Stanolind Oil and Gas Company to drill off the
*The terms "fai~1ay" and "shipping safety fairway" are
used in this context by the U.S. government and by American
shi}::lping and oil interests. In the United Ki?gdom the ~~rm
"clearway" is preferred when referring to sucn schemes.
IMCO defines a "fairway" as "An area \dthin defined limits
inside which two-way traffic normally may be expected ;"
The terms "clearway" and "shipping safety fairway" do .not
appear in the IMCO glossary.29
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~' entrar.ce to Galveston harbor. 30 After a series of confer-
ences with the oil and 2hipping interests, the Corps District
Engineer, Galveston District, r-ecommended a fainlay five
nautical miles wide in which no structures would be per-
mitted. Stanolind was issued a number of single drilling
permits outside of the recommended fairway and the first
hopeful step toward conflict resolution had been taken. 31
Further recognition of the problem was contained in a letter
from the C0!1lsDivision Engineer, Lower Mississippi Valley,
to the District Engineer, New Orleans, dated 27 October
1948, in which he stated:
This office has been giving some thought to
the necessity for providing adequate navigation
fain;~ys between the open water of the Gulf and
the various waterways and bays that empty into
or connect with the Gulf of Mexico • • • • As
the offshore oil activities increase • ~ •• The
establishment of definite criteria with respect
to the location and width of essential navigation
fairways for use in approving permits appears to
be necessary for the protection of navigation
• • • •
As offshore drilling operations increased in the Gulf
over the following years, several additional fairways were
implemented, normally on an ad hoc basis. The sequence of
events leading to the establishment of a new fai~lay normally
commenced with the leasing, by the United States Geological
32
Survey, of offshore areas for oil exploration and recovery.
The lease also authorized offshore drilling structures,
however, under the provisions of the Rivers and Harbors Act
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and state ~~d local interests. The positions of the parti-
cipants at these conferences were consistent and logical
from their own particular points of view. The shipping and
fishing interests desired to reserve the maximum possible of
unencu~bered ocean space. The oil interests wished to make
maximum use of the sub-surface lands for whfch they had paid
*so dearly. Government representatives strove for maximum
resource utilization consistent with safe naVigation. The
compromise~wh~ch ~esulted did not fully satisfy any of the
parties involved. 36 The Corps considered itself to be an
informal mediator, without legal authority to "designate
formally" fai~~ys, except within the territorial seas of
the United States. As a result, it considered the arrange-
ments which were reached to be a strictly "informal" agree-
ment between the parties concerned. The agreement was
implemented simply by the Corps refusing to issue offshore
structure permits within the agreed-upon areas. 37
The development of fairways proceeded informally and
at a leisurely pace until 1953, when the passage of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act stimulated an increase in
*The prices paid to lease exploitable offshore lands
can be astronomical if sufficient potential is considered
to exist. In bidding for Federal lands in the Santa Barbara
Channel in February of 1968, $602,719,261.60 \'las bid for
363,181 acres. One 5,400 acre tract went for $61,418,000.00,
an average of $11,373.70 per acre. 35
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the level of offshore drilling. Agreed-upon schemes were
generally two miles wide, ten miles long, and perpendicular
to the coastline. 38 Landward points of origin were at
selected Gulf ports and included anchorages where traffic
volume called for them. The schemes did not appear on navi-
gation charts, were not published in the Federal Register,
*and were not marked by aids to navigation. Ship's masters,
unfamiliar with the area, had no way of knowing they eXisted,
let alone whera_they were. In July 1953, the Corpspublished
its first "official" map of the existing system of Gulf fair-
ways. SUbsequent revisions were issued as new fairways were
implemented. 39 In 1966, the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey,
assured of the stability of the existing fairways and anchor-
ages, agreed to a suggestion by the Corpsto overprint them
on its navigation charts of the Gulf. 40 Figure 12 is a por-
tion of C. & G.S. Chart 1116 showing "Shipping Safety Fairwaysll
and anchorage areas off Texas and Louisiana. 41 The first
publication in the Federal Register concerning fairways also
occurred in 1966, on 25 January.42
*The responsibility for establishing aids to naviga-
tion rests with the United States Coast Guard. (14 U.S.C.
81). It was not until October 1966, however, that the
Coast Guard received authority to establish maritime aids,
~enerally, in the waters above the Continental Shelf.
lPL 89-622; 14 U.S.C. 81).
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FIGURE 12
DETAILS OF SHIPPING SAFETY FAIRWAYS, GULF OF MEXICO
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The combination of rapid development of offshore oil
recovery technology and the passage of the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act gave impetus to a southward movement of
drillir~ platforms into the deeper waters of the Gulf. Some
-
eXistir~ faiTI·mys were extended further to seaward and addi-
tional ones were added as necessary, according to theproce-
dures described above. A number of them ultimately extended
to the 100 fathom curve. So gradual was the process that
ship operators-did not seem to realize the ultimate conse-
quences of such an ad hoc approach. In 1965, however, the
fact struck home that although access to major ports had been
protected, no fairways had been established to accommodate
coastwise ship traff1c. 43 At the urging of the maritime
interests, the American Merchant ~Iarine Institute (AMMI) and
the Offshore Operator's Committee (OOC) put together a joint
proposal for a revised fairways scheme which would correct
the deficiency. This was presented to the Corps District
Engineer in ~~y 1967, and on 6 June 1967 he issued a Public
Notice describing the proposed revision. 44 The new scheme,
which is shown in Figure 13, was approved and published in
the Federal Register in October 1968.
As can be seen, the development of the present system
of fairways took place over a 20 year period. The result is
hardly a nodel upon ,~hich to base future schemes meant to
.
achieve the same goals. They resemble the NEv~DRI lanes in
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that they tend to concentrate opposing streams of traffic
in relatively nar-r-ow channel.s , By their physical structure
they are far inferior, being less than half as \vide and ~~­
marked by visual aids to naVigation.
The present system of Shipping Safety Fairways generates
an extremely 11igh potential for head-on meeting situations.
The fact that many vessels which operate out of Gulf ports
do not use them is the main reason that the collision rate
there is not m~ch h~gher. It is already bad enough, having
averaged better than one per month over the five year period
ending on 30 June 1970.45 More than half of the collisions
which occurred in the open ocean adjacent to the United
States in 1970 were in Gulf waters.
The reasons why so many masters fail to make use of the
fairways are several, but the most obvious is the inconvenience
which they cause. A brief look at Figure 13 is all that is
needed to see the reason. A vessel enroute from New Orleans
to Galveston must travel an extra 40 miles if it uses the
existing fairways rather than taking a direct coastal route.
Time is money, and since the danger presented by offshore
oil structures is much less insidious than that of a mine
those masters familiar with their locations will tend to
thread their way through them in order to sborten the trip.
The lack of adequate visual aids to navigation beyond 30 miles
from the coast is another factor which discourages their
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maximum use, even for vessels approaching straight into the
coast. Unless equipped viith LORAN, it is unlikely that
such a vessel can be navigated with sufficient accuracy to
remain within the fai~~y until it gets within visual range
of shore-based aids, buoys, or identifiable oil rigs.
The Coast Guard realized the potential hazard in-the
Gulf at an early date. In November 1966, at the request of
the Commandant, the Commander, Seventh Coast Guard District
init:ated i~qujries concerning the adoption of Sealanes, to
separate opposing traffic streams, in lieu of the established
fairways. The similarity to the dangers inherent in the
. 46NEMEDRI lanes was cited as the reason for change. The
proposal, however, was never seriously considered by any of
those, other than the Coast Guard, who had been concerned
with establishing the eXisting system. In a letter to the
Commandant, the ~ll requested that such action be deferred
until the existing scheme could be more firmly accepted by
all parties.47 This appears as recognition on the part of
AMMI that the powerful Gulf oil interests would strongly
resist such a change. A traffic separation scheme would
restrict oil structures from three times the ocean space
required for fairways. Apparently ~wcr was afraid it would
lose what small concessions it had already gained and that
the fairways scheme might not be implemented if it .-uppor-t.ed
the Coast Guard proposal.
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It is doubtful that anything even approachine unanimous
adhere~ce to this scheme will OCCl~ until the density of
offshore structures is such that masters have no other
choice. The full import of this classic in poor management
will then be made clear by an upturn in offshore vessel
collisions. It is difficult to believe that the government
and shipping interests have failed to grasp the lesson ~o
be learned in the North Sea, on the Borkum-Terschelling
NEMEDRI rou-te._
~odern Sealane Concents. Major credit for modern efforts
to institute standard vessel routing schemes, particularly
traffic separation schemes, goes to the Institutes of Navi-
gation of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic
of Germany. The Institutes, as a result of a general state-
ment of need contained in the 1960 SOLAS Convention, undertook
a comprehensive stUdy to determine the viability and accept-
ability of traffic separation, particularly in the Strait of
Dover. This effort has been well documented and needs no
further review here. 48 Suffice to say that it resulted in
the implementation of the first of a series of ]}1CD-arproved
traffic separation schemes on 1 June 1967. This scheme, which
is depicted in Figure 14, used natural obstacles in the center
of the Strait to separate opposing streams of shipping traf-
fie.
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FIGURE 14
TRAFFIC SEPARATION SCHEME FOR DOVER STRAIT
10' 20' 30' 40' 50' 10' 20' 30'
, ----
40' SO'
Source: nwo, Ship's Routeing a.nd Traffic Separa.tj.on
Schemes, (London: IMCO, 1971), p. 31.
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Perhaps the most significant aspect of the modern
approach to sealanes, which the Dover Strait scheme typifies,
was the involvement of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)
of IMCO. This was the intent of the Institutes of Navigation
-
from the outset; and rightly so. They wisely realized that
the problem was not confined simply to the Strait of Dover,
nor indeed to the Atlantic Ocean. Shipping accidents were
viewed on a world-wide basis. Furthermore, ship traffic in
areas like the -Strait of Dover and the Port of New York
involved ships of practically all maritime nations. To be
effective, any effort required international cooperation
and IMCO was clearly the instrument by which to achieve it.
Almost concurrently with the work of the Institutes of
Navigation, the U.S. Coast Guard stated its intention to seek
adoption of "Sealanes" .an American water-s , The first state-
ment of this intent was made in January of 1965, by the
Commandant, in a speech to the Marine Society of New York. 49
This was followed by a series of government-industry studies
in major U.S. ports. 50 The first standard sealane schemes
to be implemented by the United States were at the entrance
to the Port of New York and Delaware Bay. These conformed
to the standards that had been developed by the Institutes
51
of Navigation and accepted by IMCO. The New York scheme,
which is shown in Figure 15, was implemented without IMCO
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approval on 1 ~~y 1967, one month prior to the scheme in
the Strai -'c of Dover. It Vias approved by H1CO in lo'larch 1968.
These in.'itial schemes have been folloHed by L12ny oth:.;rs,
all approved by n:co. The total number as of April 1971
was 57. 52 It is "lorthwhile to note that all INCO-approved
schemes have u:o essential co~mon features which are:- sep-
aration of opposing streams of vessel traffic; and safe
routing aro~~d natural hazards.
Where --!,equireq, llJICO has approved safe routing through
or around ~an-made hazards, but only where the above mentioned
essential criteria have been met. Thus, the NEMEDRI routes
and Shipping Safety Fairways in the Gulf of Hexico do not
have !MCO approval and are unlikely to obtain it unless they
are modified.
The Santa Barbara Channel. It is worth making particular
mention of the coastwise Sealanes which were implemented in
the Santo Barbara Channel in January 1969 by the Coast Guard.
The primary ptL~ose of this scheme is the same as that of the
Shipping Safety Fairways, however, wiser heads have prevailed
and the gross mis-management which occurred in the Gulf of
Mexico has not been repeated. 53 As shown in Figure 16, traf-
fic separ27.ion has been incorporated along with the preserva-
tion of a structure-free route. The scheme has, accordingly,
received Il·iCO approval.
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FIGURE 16
SEALANE AND SHIPPING SAFETY FAIRWAY SYSTEM
SANTA BARBARA CHANNEL
Source: IMCO, Ship's Routein~ and Traffic Separation
Schemes. (London: II1CO, 1971), p. "79.
125
<>
'"
;"
..
.
~
...
I •
These Sealanes did not come about without the same
conflicts between competing interests as occurred in the
Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard and shipping interests were
strongly in favor of implementation prior to the leasing of
offshore areas for oil e~~loitation. The bureaucratic real
estate salesmen of the Department of the Interior (Bureau
of Land Management) and the oilnterests scoffed at concern
for the safety of navigation, and leases were consummated
for offshore lands beneath the proposed sealane areas. 54
This placed the Corps of Engin2ers in the awk\~ard position
of having to refuse structure permits to companies which had
already paid high prices for the right to do so. The Corps
took a much weaker position than it had in the Gulf of Mexico
and disclaimed its author-Lty to deny erection permits until
such time as Sealanes had been officially designated. A
compromise solution was finally arrived at in which two
major concessions were made by naVigation interests. These
were to reduce ore way lane width to one mile from two, and
to allow drilling within one half mile of a lane rather than
one mile. 55
It is premature to say that these Sealanes will not be
encroached upon, but the position the naVigation interests
were in was significantly strengthened when they were imple-
mented and approved by n~co. There can be no doubt that the
approach taken squarely addresses the oil-shipping conflict
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at an early stage ~~d will, therefore, admit of sensible
management.
Proo13T:1 Arees '.'lith niCO Schemes. The present inter-
national approach to sealanes shows much more thought_with
regard to structure and application than those which have
gone before. There are several significant factors, how-
ever, which detracted from their overall effectiveness.
At the present time, all vessel routing schemes in
international waters, and most of those within the terri-
torial seas, are voluntary. Failure of some masters, even
though they are fe·", to adhere to lane discipline while
within a sealane can give rise to very serious collisions.
Aids to navigation are a major concern in establishing
sealanes, particularly in international waters. It makes
little sense to establish a scheme which is not serviced by
aids which are adequate for the navigation accuracy required
to remain within it. The lack of adequate aids on the French
side of the Strait of Dover held up traffic separation for
years after agreement had been reached to go forward. 56
Prior to implementir~ the sealanes leading to the Port of
New York, it was necessary for the U.S. Coast Guard to ob-
tain stat·~:,ory authority to establish aids beyond the lindt
of the territorial sea. 57 This problem can be expected to
arise with each new system for which IMCO approval is.requested.
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Since the coastal state is the logical provider of such
service, the problem of who pays becomes important. Perhaps
it depends upon whether sealanes are regarded as self protec-
tive for tl1e coastal states or a service to the ship operators.
At the present time such aids as have been provided have
been established and paid for by the coastal state. This has
emphasized another problem arva-c--tna t of non-standard buoyage
for sealanes. For example, buoyage on the French side of the
Str&it of DQver_differs from that on the English side. Buoy-
age in U.S. waters differs from both of these, and so on from
country to country. In order to prevent confusion in sea-
lanes, a world-wide standard buoyage system is needed,
particularly for mQrking dangerous sunken '~ecks and other
unseen hazards whi.ch may exist in the lanes.
Summary. The history of the development of sealanes
has been traced through the present system of IMCO-approved
schemes. The reasons for their need can be seen to fall in
three major categories which are: (1 ) separation of opposing
traffic streams to prevent collisions; (2) safe routing of
vessels through or around hazardSjand (3) preservation of
routes which are maintained free of man-made hazards.
rany of the older schemes succe~sfully addressed the
particular problem for which they were developed. Some,
either due to a change in vessel traffic patterns or oversight,
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'-~ have created other situations as hazardous, or more so,
than the danger they were meant to eliminate.
The present i~orld-wide system of IMCO-approved sealancs
are structures to address all three of the previously cited
hazards simultaneously. Some problems remain; mainly those
of enforceability, protection from encroachment, and standard
buoyage. By and large, this new approach can be e)~ected to
reduce shipping accidents, particularly collisions. Collision
trends over_the four years since the first schemes were im-
plemented show hopeful signs of improvement; however, it is
premature to claim success at this time.
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APPENDIX III
APPENDIX III
GLOSSA.flY
In general, the United States accepts all terminology
which n!CO has adopted relating to vessel routing schemes.
The;:e are certain variations, hovever , ''lhich were approved
for American usage prior to TI1CO's adoption of standard
terminology. These are used to identify various elements
of vessel routing schemes which are overprinted on navigation
charts produced by the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the U.S.
Navy Oceanographic Office. Both sets of terms are given
below.
United States TerminologY:
Sealane(s) - A vessel routip~ scheme which incor-
porates traffic separation and safe routing through congested
or hazardous waters in order to reduce the risk of collision.
Sea lane - A corridor within which all vessel traf-
fic is advised to proceed in the same general direction.
Buffer zone - A zone between opposing sea lanes
which is intended to provide a safe degree of separation
between streams of vessel traffic proceeding in opposite
dil'ections.
Shipping Safety Fai~1ay - A corridor in which vessel
traffic moves generally in parallel and opposing directions.
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Normally ir.1plemented as a recommended route for vessels
through offshore oil exploitation areas, or to identify
areas which can be expected to be kept free of oil recovery
platforms.
United Kingdom Terminology:
Clean'rey - A corridor in which vessel traffic moves
generally in parallel and opposing directions. Normally
implemented as a recommended route for vessels through off-
shore oil exploitation areas, or to identify areas which can
be expected to be kept free of oil recovery platforms. Not
expected to be overprinted on navigation charts.
IMCO Terminology:
Routinpa - A complex 0:;: measures concerning routes
followed by ships and aiming at reducing the risk of casual-
ties; it includes traffic separation schemes, fairways,
tracks and deep-draught routes.
Traffic separation scheme - A scheme which aims at
reducing the risk of collision in congested and/or converging
areas by separating traffic.
Traffic lane - .An area \'Iithin defin:t te limits inside
which all ships are advised to proceed in approximately the
same direction.
Track - A r-ecommended direction of general traffic
flow without definite boundaries or with only one sucn boun-
dary.
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FairNay - An area within defined limits inside
which two-~Iay traffic normally may be expected.
Separation zone or line - The zone or line sepa-
ratip5 traffic proceeding in opposite, or nearly opposite,
directions.
Roundabout - A traffic separation scheme in\vhich
traffic moves in a counter-cloc~lise direction around a
specified point or zone.
Inshore traffic z~ - An area betvleen the landward
boundary of a traffic separation scheme and the adjacent
coast intended for coastal traffic.
Deep-draught route - A route which is primarily
selected for use by ships whicll, because of their draught,
"-
cannot navigate safely outside such route.
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